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Abstract 
During the Gulf crisis in 1990-91, Japan was extremely reluctant to send its 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas and join the multinational military forces 
fighting against Iraq. Tokyo finally deployed minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, but 
it was two months after the end of war. In contrast, Japan's policy responses on 
overseas dispatch of the SDF to the war against terrorism launched by the United 
States in 2001 were extraordinary quick and positive. Only about one and half month 
after the September 11 terrorist attack, three anti-terrorism bills, which allow the SDF 
to be d ispatched d uring t he w ar, w ere p assed in the Japanese D iet. A t a round t he 
same time, several naval vessels from the MSDF were deployed in the Indian Ocean. 
Given these dramatic changes, this research examines why Japan had a different 
policy response in terms of overseas dispatch of the SDF towards the U.S.-initiated 
wars in 1991 and 2001. Based on an investigation on the two cases in 1991 and 2001, 
it attempts to explore the underlying reason of the defense policy changes on 
overseas dispatch of the SDF in postwar Japan through strategic cultural perspective. 
This study argues that, in addition to the various international and domestic factors, 
the fundamental shift of the Japanese strategic culture in both ruling and social level 
since the end of the Cold War is also one of the important reasons that caused the 
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Why Different Policy Responses in Two Similar Crises? 
7.7 Central Question 
This research is motivated by a simple but surprising fact that took place in Japan 
just between ten years: During the Gulf crisis in 1990-91，the Japanese government 
was extremely reluctant to send its armed forces overseas. Except a few politicians 
inside the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the attitude of the major 
Oppositions in the Diet as well as the Japanese general public opinion towards this 
issue was negative. A survey conducted in late 1990 showed that only less than 20 
percent of those polled supported the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces 
(SDF ox Jieitaif. Tokyo eventually decided to send six minesweepers to the Arabian 
Sea, but it was two months after the end of the war. 
In contrast, Japan's response to the September 11 terrorist attack and anti-
terrorism war launched by the United States in 2001 was extraordinary swift. Except 
the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Social Democratic Party (SDP)，both are 
minorities in the Japanese national Diet, all major political parties in Japan as well as 
the public opinion supported the official dispatch of the SDF overseas for assisting 
‘For details, see the survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun in 1990 in Hook (1996), pp.114-115. 
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the U.S. military operations against terrorism in principle^. Only about one month 
after t he t errorist a ttack, t hree d efense b ills w ere p assed b y t he Ja panose N ational 
Diet, which permit the SDF to be deployed overseas to provide rear echelon support 
to American forces fighting in Afghanistan. A few days after the enactment of the 
bills, three naval vessels were deployed to the Indian Ocean. 
Given this dramatic change in Japan's defense policy in terms of overseas 
dispatch of the SDF in just one decade, this research tries to tackle the question as 
follows: Why did Japan have a different policy responses in terms of SDF's overseas 
dispatch to the U.S.-initiated wars in 1991 and 2001? 
1,2 Main Argument 
In the literature on Japan's security policy, three different interpretations to the 
overseas dispatch of the SDF are offered. They are: the rational actor perspective, the 
government politics perspective and the perspective of shame. The rational actor 
perspective emphasizes on the importance of rationality and self-interest towards the 
foreign and defense policy behavior of a state. This perspective suggests that the 
dispatch of the SDF in 2001 was a policy behavior with a careful calculation of 
interests (Xiao, 2000; Wong and Wu, 2002). The government politics perspective 
offers an explanation from domestic and institutional dimension. It explains that it is 
2 For details, see Midford (2003). 
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the differences in the popularity of leadership and the different balance of power of 
political parties in the Diet that leads to the different policy responses on the overseas 
deployment of the SDF in two similar crises (Keddell，1993; Midford, 2003). The 
shame perspective cultivates its interpretation from a psychological dimension. It 
suggests that the feeling of shame derived from the critics of the world during the 
Gulf crisis in 1990-91，stimulates the determination of Japanese leadership on 
overseas dispatch of the SDF soon after the September 11 attack (Katzenstein 2002; 
Midford 2003). 
These interpretations did provide convincing explanations on the defense policy 
change of Japan in just between ten years. However, their arguments are not without 
problems. The rational actor perspective simply puts its focus on the universal nature 
of rationality, but fails to answer why Japan had a different policy response on the 
overseas dispatch in two similar crises even Japan has similar oil interests in the 
Middle East in the two periods; The government politics perspective seems providing 
a cogent explanation on this issue, yet it ignores the fundamental change in Japan's 
perception on military affairs. Hence, it could not explain why most of the Japanese 
political parties, particularly the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the biggest 
Opposition in the Diet, supported the overseas dispatch of the SDF in 2001; The 
perspective of shame, however, has neither explained why the concept of "shame" 
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could be a unique perspective for interpreting Japan's security policy, nor organized 
their analyses with a systematic framework. Owing to these reasons, this research is 
designed to fill out all these vacancies. 
The thesis is about the overseas dispatch of the SDF in postwar Japan. Based on 
the empirical study on two cases, this research attempts to examine the reasons for 
the different responses of Japan to the two wars in 1 990-91 and 2001 in terms of 
overseas dispatch of the SDF. It argues that, the different policy response on the 
issue of overseas military dispatch during the two international crises was not only 
caused by the shift of the balance of power of political parties in the Japanese Diet, 
but also by the fundamental change in paradigms inside the strategic culture in both 
ruling and social level in Japan. It is hoped that this research could provide a new 
perspective in understanding Japan's security policy and enrich the empirical 
research to the literature of strategic culture in the security studies. 
L3 The Layout 
To find the answer of the central question more adequately, this paper is 
organized as follows. Chapter Two firstly reviews the current studies relating to the 
overseas dispatch of the SDF in postwar Japan with theoretical perspective. The 
concepts and analytical approach that employed in the research, the data sources and 
the research method will also be clarified in this chapter. Based on the previous 
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review, Chapter Three introduces the sources of Japan's strategic culture in postwar 
era through two different level—ruling and social level. Chapter Four and Five are 
case studies. The policy responses on overseas deployment in 1990-91 and 2001 will 
be examined in depth, which aims to show the change in paradigms inside the 
Japanese strategic culture in different levels and its effect to Japan's defense policy 
in terms of overseas dispatch. The final chapter will assess the significance and the 
limitation of this research. 
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Chapter Two 
A Theoretical Framework for Analysis: 
The Concept of Strategic Culture 
After the dispatch of the six minesweepers and the establishment of the 
International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL, Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Ho) 
between 1991 and 1992 during Kaifu and Miyazawa cabinet, commentaries in the 
United States and China had different interpretations of this event, though both of 
them all agree that such policy changes marked a turning point of Japan's security 
policy since 1945. 
On the one hand, observers in the United States, who have been always 
unsatisfied with Japan's unwillingness to take more responsibilities in the 
international security affairs, interpreted the deployment of Japanese Maritime Self 
Defense Forces (JMSDF) in the Persian Gulf is a sign of bearing more 
responsibilities to contribute to the international security, rather than being a banker 
or trader^ The Chinese side, on the other hand, regarded this policy changes as a 
reflection of Japan's intention to revive its military power and to erode the 
3 For such viewpoint, please see "Japan, by Sending Minesweepers to the Gulf, Takes Step Toward 
Broader World Role," Wall Street Journal, 25 April 1991, p. A10. 
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constraints stipulated by the Article 9 of Peace Constitution"^. As for the Chinese, 
the historical suffering from the invasion of the Japanese imperialism and 
militarism, and the lack of guilty revealed by some Japanese politicians, made them 
almost impossible to recognize the legitimacy of Japanese overseas military 
dispatch. 
It is understandable that both sides have a different interpretation to Japan's 
policy changes based on their own subjective criteria. Yet, observers in both two 
sides seems to have ignored an important fact: Japan actually did not provide any 
military contribution or send any military forces overseas before or during the seven 
months of crisis, even though under a huge degree of international pressure. 
Therefore, an approiate question that should be asked is, why did Japan show 
reluctant to send its military forces overseas during the Gulf crisis? 
In contrast, the prompt overseas military dispatch of Japan after the September 
11 terrorist attack in 2001 projected a very different image to the international 
community. Just two months after the terrorist attack, the Koizumi cabinet decided 
to send three destroyers to the Indian Ocean in order to provide logistic supports to 
the US forces fighting in Afghanistan. It has been interpreted as the first and biggest 
overseas military deployment in Japan's postwar history, and it was also Japan's 
4 For example, see Yang BoJiang, "Gulf War Challenges Japan's Foreign Policy," Beijing Review.ll-
28 April 1991,pp. 9-11. 
7 
first time to send the SDF overseas during a war. Following this new development, 
a question should also be asked here is, why did Japan show strong willingness on 
sending the SDF overseas in this crisis? 
The prompt overseas dispatch of the Japanese military forces in 2001 and the 
reluctant responses to the Persian Gulf Crisis in 1990-91，actually provide an 
excellent comparative angle to investigate the essence of Japan's defense policy 
related to the overseas dispatch of the SDF. It leads us to seek to answer the major 
question being proposed in this research: Why did Japan have a different policy 
response in terms of overseas dispatch to the US initiated wars in 1991 and 2001 ？ 
In this chapter, after briefly evaluating the relevant competing explanations 
from different perspective, I will introduce the theory of strategic culture, the 
analytical approach that will be applied in this research, as well as how this concept 
could be used to interpret Japan's policy responses in these two international crises. 
The research method and the data sources will also be clarified in the end of this 
chapter. 
2,1 Competing Explanations 
The literature review in this chapter will primarily focus on the analytical 
approaches that were consciously and unconsciously adopt by the studies on Japan's 
policy response during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91 and September 11 terrorist attack 
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in 2001. Given the analytical perceptive, the studies related to the overseas dispatch 
of the SDF can be divided into three categories: rational actor perspective, 
government politics perspective and shame perspective. 
The Rational Actor Perspective 
The rational actor perspective has been an indispensable and dominant toolkit 
in the arena of political science. It views that individuals are self-interested, and 
"have all the rational capacity, time and emotional detachment necessary to choose 
the best course of action, no matter how complex the choice"(Ward, 2002，p.68). 
Similarly, by employing this perspective to understand the behavior of a state, 
classical realism, one of the most important theories in IR studies, also assumes that 
states are rational, self-interested and pursue attainable goals that are commensurate 
with the power to achieve. A state's foreign and security policy is determined by its 
calculations of the national interests, and states tend to, like what Hans Morganthau 
argues, "think and act in terms of power"(Morganthau, 1993，p.5). 
Many studies conducted by Chinese scholars consciously and unconsciously 
adopt this approach to interpret the overseas dispatch of the SDF. By employing a 
rational actor perspective, Chinese scholars tend to view the dispatch of the SDF in 
1991 and 2001，and the establishment of the IPCL and the Anti-Terrorism Law as an 
intentional and calculated strategic adjustment. For instance, Xiao Wei, a researcher 
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with Chinese military background, r egards the d ispatch of six minesweepers a fter 
the end of the Gulf War in 1991 as erosion to the constitutional constraint on the 
overseas military dispatch by “some Japanese politicians"(Xiao, 2000，p.193). Wu 
Ji-nan, a Japanese specialist in Shanghai, also argues that Japan's policy responses 
after the September 11 attack was due to its calculation of its own national interests, 
as the international terrorism threats its sea lanes and free trade system which 
Japan's economy relies on. He further argues that Japan's quick dispatch was also 
due to its strong willingness to strengthen the U.S.-Japan relations and to enlarge the 
scope ofSDF's activities (Wong and Wu, 2002，pp.394-396). 
The rational actor perspective employed by these Chinese scholars might be 
right when explaining Japan's performance in one o f t h e s e crises. However, such 
kind of interpretation could not deal with the question of why Japan responded to the 
two similar crises both lead by the United States in quite different approach. Xiao's 
argument, for instance, basically tends to focus on Japan's response after the Gulf 
War, rather than before and during the crisis. In other words, Xiao ignored the facts 
that the Japanese government was exceedingly reluctant to send the SDF to the 
Persian Gulf during the entire crisis even it has the capability to do so. It is true that 
some Japanese politicians intended to use the enactment of a new bill to erode the 
constitutional constraint on defense issue, but such attempt failed eventually, which 
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implies that there was no consensus on the issue of the SDF overseas dispatch in 
Japanese society during those periods of time. 
Wu's explanation, on the other hand, provides a valid explanation on Japan's 
responses to the September 11 attack and the anti-terrorist war. However, his 
perspective fails to explain Japan's different responses to the two similar crises in 
comparative angle. If Japan is a rational, self-interested actor, constantly calculating 
its own interests, and also consciously intends to strengthen its relationship with the 
U.S. and enlarge the scope of SDF's activities in international crisis like what he 
argues, then why did the Japanese government and the general public opinion 
responded negatively on sending armed forces before and during the Gulf crisis in 
1990-91，even though Japan has 60 percent of its oil supply from this area in the 
long term? In a nutshell, the rational actor perspective is incapable to explain why 
‘‘change,，occurs in the policy behavior if the actor could gain benefits from both the 
two similar situations. 
Government Politics Perspective 
The government politics perspective is also an appropriate approach to explain 
Japan's reluctant responses to the Gulf Crisis in 1990-91. This perspective argues 
that the domestic struggle between different parties inside the Diet may tend to 
constrain and delay a quick formulation of policy. 
11 
In the case of Japan's response to Gulf crisis in 1990-91，Joseph Keddell, for 
instance, argues that the "increased opposition party electoral strength was largely 
responsible for government policy and institutional immobilism over PKO 
deliberation from 1990 and 1992，’(Keddel，1993，p. 189). In other words, as Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP) gained the majority in the Upper House during the crisis, it is 
almost impossible for the LDP to pass the PKO bills and send naval vessels to the 
Persian Gulf before and during the Gulf War. Addressing the case of Japan's policy 
response to anti-terrorism war in 2001, Midford argues that "a shift in the balance of 
power in the Diet would seem to offer the best proximate reason for the government 
abilities to enact the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law authorizing, among other 
things, the dispatch of the MSDF to the Arabian Sea"(Midford, 2003，p.336). 
It should not be denied t hat the domestic politics perspective does provide a 
valid and convincing explanation to Japan's performance in both two crises. 
However, this explanation is still problematic. Firstly, from the theoretical 
perspective, it fails to provide a medium and long-term prediction to the policy 
changes, as the political actors in the Diet and the government changes constantly, 
particularly in a democratic country like Japan. Secondly, the government politics 
perspective could hardly explain the general support of the SDF overseas dispatch in 
the Diet except the JCP and SDP. In other words, why did most o f the Japanese 
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political parties, particularly the DPJ, the biggest opposition party in the Diet, also 
support the overseas dispatch of SDF proposed by the LDP in 2001? In this sense, It 
could be concluded that the explanation offered by the domestic politics perspective 
is somehow inadequate, as we can correctly assume that the SDF could still be 
dispatched even the LDP and its allies did not gain the majority seats in the Japanese 
Diet during 2001. 
The Shame Perspective 
Literature of the shame perspective could be divided into two categories. One is 
the explanation without systematic framework; the other is the analysis with 
theoretical background. 
The former one is represented by Midford's studies in 2003. According to his 
analysis, there are number of factors playing important role in causing the dispatch 
of SDF in 2001. Except the factors stated before, he intentionally mentioned the 
importance of shame towards the policy on overseas dispatch. Based on the short 
content analysis on the articles written by former high-ranked officials from 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published on Gaiko Forum, a journal with 
official background, Midford concludes that the sense of shame resulting from the 
critics during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91 created a "never again" reflex, which 
formulate a strong support for the overseas dispatch of the SDF in 2001 (Midford, 
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2003, pp.337-338). To some extend, Midford's conclusion is convincible, as he 
captured the way of thinking in both the mind of Japanese political elites and the 
general public. A report written by a Japanese journalist from Mainichi Shimbun 
also confirmed that the policy makers inside the Japanese government did have such 
kind of feeling and perception towards this issue (Komatsu, 2001). However, this 
kind of analysis seems too simple and without systematic framework, as it didn't 
intend to generalize the observation up to a theoretical level and buttress it with 
relevant empirical cases. It would be very easier to be accused as a tautological 
argument. 
The second type of analysis from the shame perspective is represented by 
Katzenstein's article published in 2002. In the article, although he did not build his 
argument with a theoretical framework, Katzenstein's analysis is obviously based on 
his analytical model constructed previously. Therefore, it is necessary to take a 
glance to his theory first. 
Katzenstein's analysis on Japanese security policy was represented by two 
books titled Japan 's National Security: Structure, Norms, and Policy Response in a 
Changing World，and Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in 
Postwar Japan. Adopting a c onstructivist approach, Katzenstein suggests in these 
5 This book is co-author with Nobuo Okawara, a Japanese scholar. 
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two books that the "non-violence culture" is the major character of Japan's security 
policy，which is reflected in the structural and normative context in the decision 
making process. Such a viewpoint further argues that the majority of Japanese 
society believes the nuclear weapons and a strong military force would generate 
neither wealth nor strength, but a great economic cost, immense political and 
military risks instead (Katzenstein and Okawara, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996). Based on 
this theoretical assumption, Katzenstein did not put much attention to explain why 
the Japanese government has loosed its restriction on the ban of overseas dispatch 
after the Gulf crisis in these two books. Conversely, he argues that such change did 
not severely undermine the non-violence normative context on security affairs, as 
the relevant PKO bills that permit SDF to be deployed overseas has focus on the 
non-military activities, rather than the combatant mission, which shows the rigidity 
of Japanese military security policy with non-violence style (Katzenstein, 1996， 
pp.124-126). 
In his article published recently, Katzenstein still suggests that the overseas 
dispatch of the SDF in 2001 was just "to show resolve and thus to escape the 
criticism of being a do-nothing power, a painful memory of the Persian Gulf 
War"(Katzenstein, 2002, p.429). He claims that such policy change does not 
represent a radical change in Japan's security strategy, as the main mission of the 
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SDF in the 2001 operation was still non-combatant in nature (Katzenstein, 2002). 
Although Katzenstein did not mention the word of "shame" in his arguments, the 
logic behind his argument is similar to that of Midford. 
Katzenstein，s argument seems convincing on the surface, but his analyses are 
still problematic. Firstly, it fails to distinguish the different meanings behind the 
concept of "non-violence culture" in the context of Japan. In Japanese sense, the 
"non-violence culture" can at least have two meanings: the "incrementalism"(or in 
Japanese called nashikuzushi) showed in the Yoshida Doctrine, the strategic thinking 
shared by high level Japanese political elites inside LDP, and the "pacifist thought", 
mainly shared by the socialist left parties and the masses. It is true, as Katzenstein 
argues that the passage of ICPL in 1992 and the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2001 still 
strictly restrain the power and function of the SDF when they are participating in the 
overseas operations. However, Katzenstein apparently underestimates the 
significance of such change under the logic of incrementalism. Ten years after the 
Gulf War, Japan has reaffirmed its alliance with the United States and become more 
willing to share security burden with the U.S. in or even beyond the Asian Pacific 
region. The enactment of the New Security Guideline between the U.S. and Japan in 
1997，and the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2001, all endows Japan with a legal ground to 
deploy its SDF in certain situation. At the moment, though the security situation in 
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the East Asia still has not yet stimulated Japan to use its armed force either 
independently or collectively in the conflict, the development of Japan's defense 
policy is steadfastly moving to the direction of legitimizing the use of force in 
overseas missions. 
In operational level, it would be very easy for the JSDF to exercise the right of 
collective self defense which is banned by the Peace Constitution if the U.S. troops 
are attacked in the rear area in the future conflict. In this sense, the accurate 
description of Japan's policy and public attitude towards the military affairs after the 
end of the Cold War should likely to be described as "temporarily anti-militarism", 
as it is very possible that the attitude towards the use of force could be shifted when 
facing a rapid change in its strategic environment in terms of material and normative 
structure. 
Owing to this, Katzenstein's forecast of the future development of Japanese 
security policy is also questionable. He opines that the new Japanese security culture 
would be non-violent in nature, as he has found that both the Japanese police and the 
SDF are reluctant to use force on the internal and international security affairs since 
1945. With these reasons, he predicts that even in the face of abandonment by the 
United States, Japan's culture of non-violence would still lead to an exploration of 
all other options before its last resort of becoming a "Normal Country"(Katzenstein, 
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1996). Unfortunately, these predictions may not square entirely with by the recent 
developments. Although the current Japanese defense policy has been still relying 
on its alliance with the U.S., It is evidenced that Japan is becoming more confident 
in using armed force even without the support of the U.S. if it necessities. For 
example, more than one Japanese high level officials have warned the North Korean 
leaders that Japan would be prepared to launch a pre-emptive strike if it detects that 
Pyongyang is fuelling ballistic missiles in preparation for an attack to Japan. This 
intention was finally clearly stated in the Defense White Paper published in 1999 (Si 
Wei, 2001,p.298). 
It is apparent that the current Japanese security cultural norms are gradually 
departing from the non-violence security culture in dealing with its changing 
strategic environment. Yet, it is still a question that where it is heading and in what 
ways. As Thomas Berger has warned: although the cultural norms have truly shifted 
from militarism in postwar Japan, it is possible that they could shift back if the 
United States abandoned Japan (Berger, 1996). 
The difficulties that the various perspectives faced mentioned above, implies 
that the research should be push forward by employing a new perspective. In this 
process, strategic culture, a new concept that has risen in the security studies since 
1980s, deserves attention. 
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2,2 The Theory of Strategic Culture 
The Origin and Development 
The first analysis that employed the concept of strategic culture was Jack 
Syder's RAND study on Soviet nuclear war doctrine in 1977(Alastair, 1995, p.5). 
In the study, Syder points out that the Soviet's strategists did not appear to share the 
beliefs, preference and p ractice that are c entral t o American nuclear strategy. He 
further criticized the U.S. strategists for trying to predict Soviet's strategic 
behaviors based on their own rationality, rather than investigating the attitudes of 
Soviets decision-makers (Syder, 1977，pp.3-4). It was this observation gives rise to 
the concept of strategic culture. The key statement about Syder's view of strategic 
culture is as follows: 
It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a 
unique ‘strategic culture'. Individuals are socialized into a distinctively 
Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, 
a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to 
nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi permanence that placed them 
on the level of 'culture' rather than mere ‘policy，. Of course, attitudes 
may change as a result of changes in technology and the international 
environment. However, now problems are not assessed objectively. 
Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens by the strategic culture 
(Syder, 1977，p.v.) 
Based on the argument mentioned above, Syder regards the "strategic culture", as 
"the body of attitudes and beliefs that guides and circumscribes thought on strategic 
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questions, influences the way strategic issue are formulated, and sets the vocabulary 
and the perceptual parameters of strategic debate”(Syder, 1977，p.9). 
Syder indeed is very cautious in using the concept of strategic culture. He 
wonders how great the differences in different nation's strategic culture are, which 
renders the uncertainty of the explanatory power of the concept. In one of his 
articles published in 1990，he argues, "In principle, differences in military strategy 
across states might be explained solely in terms of objective differences in the 
structure of their external or internal circumstances, without regard to subjectivity 
cultural difference"(Syder, 1990，p.5). He further claims that strategic culture is 
only an explanation to be used when all else fails, and the concept of culture is only 
useful when a distinctive strategy takes hold, and then culture "tends to persist 
despite changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of 
socialization and institutionalization and through the role of strategic concepts in 
legitimating these social arrangements" (Syder, 1990, p.4). 
At around the same time as Syder addressed the difference of between the 
Soviet and US strategic behaviors, Ken Booth also noticed the fact of strategic 
culture in affecting a nation's military strategy. In 1979，he published a book titled 
Strategy and Ethnocentrism, which attempts to "make strategists more aware of the 
manner in which the 'fog of culture' interfered in the making and study of strategy" 
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and "sought to raise consciousnesses about the dangers of ethnocentrism" 
(Macmillan, Booth and Trood, 1999, p.5). He further suggests that strategists have 
to replace "rational" strategic man with "national" strategic man (Booth, 1979，p. 13， 
15,16,20 and 152). 
Obviously, Booth's view to strategic culture is very different with Syder. In 
fact, he criticized Syder's narrow understanding to the concept of strategic culture. 
In one of his articles, he refuted that it is impossible to view the organizational 
structure, political processes and decision-making structures apart from a cultural 
context, which clearly be shown by the unique behavioral patterns of military 
establishments in different society. Responding to Syder，s worry on the weakness 
of cultural approach in providing a testable, accurate and substantial explanation 
compared with other analytical approach, Booth argues that "cultural explanation 
do not exclude other 'useful' explanations and that those other explanations may 
well themselves contain a cultural dimension"(Booth, 1990，p. 124). Based on this 
methodological view, he develops his concept of strategic culture, which was 
regarded as a standard definition in the literature. The following paragraphs are the 
most significant statements about his view of "strategic culture": 
The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, 
pattern of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of 
adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or 
use of force. 
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A strategic culture is persistent over time, but neither particular elements 
nor a particular as a whole are immutable...The strategic culture of a nation 
derives from its history, geography and political culture, and it represents the 
aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential 
voices; these maybe, depending on the nation, the political elite, the military 
establishment and or public opinion. 
A strategic culture defines a set of pattern of and for a nation's behavior 
on war and peace issue. It helps shape but does not determine how a nation 
interacts with others in the security field. Other explanations (e.g., 
technological push) play a greater or 1 esser role in particular circumstances. 
Strategic culture helps shape behavior issue as the use of force in international 
politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic 
doctrine. As a result of continuities in these matters, it is legitimate in talk 
about a particular national 'style' in the theory and practice of strategy (Booth, 
1990,p.l21). 
Following Syder and Booth, the study of strategic culture has become diversified. 
Many other scholars in the strategic studies have tried to develop the concept based 
on their own understanding. According to Alastair Johnston's classification, the 
development of the concept of strategic culture is divided into three generations. 
The first generation (including Syder and Booth) consists of the security-
policy analysts and Soviet specialists in early 1980s. Their works usually focused 
on the question of why the Soviets and Americans thought differently about their 
nuclear strategy. Therefore, in their study, the concept of “strategic culture" refers 
to the different strategic thinking, which is deeply rooted in a country's historical 
experiences, political culture, geography and other variables. The second generation, 
which arose in the mid-1980s, still pays attention on the difference of Soviet-US 
strategic behavior, but it emphasizes more on the possibility of a disjuncture 
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between a symbolic strategic-culture discourse and operational doctrines. The third 
generation, which has emerged since the 1990s，"has been more conceptually and 
methodologically rigorous". The scholars of this generation tend to regard the 
particular strategic decisions as dependent variables, and focus more on the military 
culture, political-military culture or other organizational culture' to consolidate the 
concept of strategic culture (Alastair，1995a, p.5; Alastair, 1995b, pp.36-43). 
The three generations' works on strategic culture have many conceptual 
problems. For example, Johnston points out that the inputs (like geography, 
organization culture, tradition, political culture, political psychology, historical 
historic practice) of strategic culture that the first generation raises are too broad, 
implying that there is little conceptual room for a non-strategic culture explanation 
of strategic choices, and it renders valid test of this model extremely difficult. 
Johnston is also skeptical of what the first generation implied that strategic thought 
only led consistently to one type of behavior. In his view: “it would be more logical 
to conclude that the diversity of a particular society's geographical, political, 
cultural, and strategic experience will produce multiple strategic cultures, but this 
possibility is excludes by the narrow determinism of the first generation 
literature"(Johnston, 1995b, pp.37-38). 
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The second generation is not perfect either. According to Johnston, this 
generation argues, “there is a vast difference between what leaders think or say they 
are doing and their deeper motives foe what in fact they do. Strategic culture is seen 
as a tool of political hegemony in the realm of strategic decision-making”(Johnston, 
1995b, p.39). However, Johnston points out that many researches on leadership 
studies have actually found the dialectical relationship between strategic culture and 
operational behavior, meaning that the leaders can also be constrained by the 
symbolic myths they or their predecessors created or manipulated. Johnston further 
writes that most of second generation's work "has not looked enough at enough 
comparative cases to trace whether certain discourse and symbolic languages have 
actually narrowed debate, or to determine whether this narrowing differs across 
cases, and whether the choices and options that remain are different across cases" 
(Johnston, 1995b, p.41). 
The third generation is more rigorous than the previous two. According to 
Johnston, they regard the particular strategic decision as dependent variables and 
ideational factors as independent variable. As a result, in their studies, phrases like 
"military culture", "political-military culture" are often used. The third generation is 
more successful in conceptualization compared with the previous one: First, they 
refrain from being determinist, meaning the culture could change. Second, they 
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usually provide competing theory testing, which strengthens thereliability o f t h e 
concept. However, Johnston also raised a question that is worth to think: Where do 
these "military culture" and "political-military culture" which affect decision-
makers come from? It seems that the cultural values that the third generation 
accentuates is less rooted in historical practice, but recent experience. If that is the 
case, what is the difference between the concept of organizational culture and 
strategic culture (Johnston, 1995b, pp.41-43)? 
To avoid the mistake committed by these previous scholars, Johnston has 
made his own conceptualization of strategic culture in his studies of Chinese 
ancient war history. He claims that "strategic culture" is "an integrated system of 
symbols (e.g., argumentation structure, language, analogies, metaphor) which acts 
to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating 
concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and 
by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic 
preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious" (Johnston, 1995b, p.46). 
According to Johnston, the “system of symbols" comprises two parts. The first part 
is about the orderliness of the strategic environment, like the role of war in human 
affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use 
of force. The second part refers to the strategic options that reflect the efficacy of 
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the use of force in dealing with the threat environment. Johnston asserts that it is the 
second part of preferences over actions marks the direct influence of strategic 
culture in shaping strategic behavior (Johnston, 1995b, p.46). Adopting this 
conceptualization, Johnston believes that it can make the concept of strategic 
culture more scientific and falsifiable. He claims that "the essential empirical 
referent of a strategic culture is a limited, ranked set of grand strategic preference 
that is consistent across the objects of analysis and persistent over time", and the 
ranking is not necessarily responsive to the changes of non-cultural variables like 
technology. Based on this perception, he thinks that his model can provide 
empirical prediction against other models of choices by tracing history over cases 
and historical times (Johnston, 1995b, pp.48-49). 
Studies of Strategic Culture in China and Japan 
Apart form the American scholars' efforts on the studies of strategic culture, 
Asian scholars have also paid much attention to this issue. Most of these works 
have only introduced the nature of strategic culture of a particular nation, but fail to 
explore the source of strategic culture and the way in which strategic culture affects 
a specific security policy behavior with an analytical framework. For example, the 
military academic journal China Military Science has published numbers of articles 
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about the strategic culture of different countries^. Takesada Hideshi, a Japanese 
researcher from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan, has analyzed 
the different strategic behavioral orientations with regard to the different cultures 
among the Asian-Pacific nations (includes Japan, PRC, the United States, Russia, 
North and S outh Korea). He suggests that it is worth for the 1 eadership o f those 
countries dedicating their time to understand each other's distinctive way of 
strategic thinking which is usually influenced by their culture (Takesada, 1999, 
pp.134-144). 
Among the studies of strategic culture in Asian academic circle, a book called 
The Irredentist Yu-Yuen Campaign: A Strategic Analysis of the Catastrophic 
Failure in the Sung-Liao War published by Tsang Shui-lung, a historian in Hong 
Kong, also deserves attention. In this book, the concept of strategic culture was 
rigorously applied to analyze the war history of ancient China (Sung Dynasty). 
Different with Johnston's conclusion that the Chinese ancient strategic culture was 
also realpolitik in nature, Tsang argues that the Confucian value did play an 
important role in limiting the use of force in ancient Chinese war history. Based on 
6 Most of these articles were published between 1998 and 2001 on the China Militaiy Science. For the 
studies related to Japan, see, for example: Chen Lu (1999) "Ri Bwn Wen Hua Chuan Tongyu Ri 
Ben Jun Guo Zhu Yi (Japan 's Cultural Tradtion and Japanese Militarism)”, in China Military 
Science. No.4, pp. 143-149; Xian Si, Chen, Wei Hua, Cheng (2001) “Shi Xi Jing Dai Ri Ben De 
Jing Shen Wen Hua Yu Gua Ce (Japan 's Philosophical Culture and its National Policies)”, in 
China Military Science. No.5, pp.31-38. 
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his case studies of four campaigns, Tsang explains that failure of Song's military 
attack to the Liao Dynasty in northern China for unification between 979 and 987 
A.D. was due to the gap of strategic culture in grand strategic level and operational 
level. It is this fundamental reason, Tsang claims, caused the catastrophic military 
failure of Song's war against Liao (Tsang, 2003). 
Studies of Strategic Culture related to Japan's Security Policy 
Regarding to the works that apply the concept of strategic culture to analyze 
Japan, only few of them have been shown in the literature. Such studies could be 
basically sub-divided into two groups based on historical period: prewar Japan and 
postwar Japan. 
For the prewar Japan, for instance, Forrest E. Morgan, who had worked for the 
United States Air Force and now is a policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, has 
applied the concept of strategic culture to analyze the Japanese foreign and security 
policy behavior under the condition of foreign compellence in prewar era. In his 
study, Morgan starts his analysis by drawing out a central question of how strategic 
culture affected the way of Imperial Japan responded when other states tried to 
compel it to change its policies. By applying the concept from anthropology, 
sociology and psychology regarding Japan to his three case studies between 1895 
and 1945, he proves the effect of strategic culture on the foreign policy behaviors of 
28 
Imperial Japan (Morgan, 2003). Yet, Morgan's research is not without problems. It 
is still easy to be accused as a tautological analysis as Morgan simply used the 
generalization on Japan's national character from other discipline to profile the 
character of Japanese strategic culture in prewar era, 
For the postwar Japan, for example, Sajima Naoko, a Japanese security 
specialist from the National Institute for Defense Studies, has adopted the concept 
of s trategic c ulture t o a nalyze t he s ecurity p olicy development i n p ostwar Ja pan. 
However, she did not build a detailed theoretical framework in the research. In her 
analysis, Sajima claims that the anti-militarism culture in Japan that developed from 
the democratization and demilitarization in early post war era has still been 
influential in contemporary Japanese society. She insists that "the Meiji 
authoritarian state was an exception in the history of Japan and democracy has 
taken deep root, the ghost of militarism will never rise again "(Sajima, 1999, pp.69-
91). 
2.3 Defining “Strategic Culture" in this Research 
The review on the theory of strategic culture stated above reveals at least five 
sets of questions that deserve further attention. 1) What is strategic culture? How 
could we identify the strategic culture of a nation? 2) What is the source of strategic 
culture? 3) What is the primary referent group for strategic culture? 4) To what 
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extend does strategic culture affect the outcome of policies? Does strategic culture 
determine a nation's policy behaviors? 5) Would strategic culture change? How far 
would the strategic culture of a nation be changed? In the following part, I will try 
to answer these questions through the process of conceptualization, which will be 
used to interpret Japan's different policy responses to the international crisis in 
1991 and 2001. 
Definition of Strategic Culture 
In this research, my verdict to the definition of strategic culture will be: 
The distinctive core value system and beliefs that consists of self-image and 
collective identity with regard to the issue of national security, military and use of 
force. This core value system is not only widely shared bypolitical andm ilitary 
elites, but also the mass public. Strategic culture is able to influence strategic 
preference and legitimizes or narrows strategic choices. 
The definition of strategic culture mentioned above, firstly, does not deny the 
importance of rationality or claims as the only dominant factor that determines the 
strategic decision. This is the reason why I abandon Johnston's concept of strategic 
culture, as he claims in his book that strategic culture determines the strategic 
choice but he cannot deny the influence of interest-driven rationality on the 
strategic choice in his case studies (Johnston, 1995a, p.250). Therefore, the concept 
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of strategic culture should be regarded as an intervening variable that reflects 
"limited rationality" or "cultural bounded rationality" rooted in "national traditions", 
and that is different from those so-called "statist military logic", which refers to 
"the universal instrumentalist logic of survival in international anarchy" (Macmillan 
and others, 1999，p.13). Based on this assumption, one can argue that the common 
understanding of the so-called strategic rationality consists of two parts. One is the 
statist military logic, which is the part that the realists tend to focus on. The other is 
the strategic culture (or cultural bounded rationality), which this research will focus 
on. Inside the strategic rationality, strategic culture is the foundation and the context 
of “statist military logic", and it works like a filter, being able to shape, legitimize 
and limit the consequence-driven utility and implementation of a particular national 
security policy that derived from the statist military logic. This process of both two 
variables is shown in Figure 2.1 and 2.2. 
Secondly, it should be clarified that strategic culture of a nation is mutable 
when facing changes in its strategic environment both ideationally and materially, 
and therefore, these changes could shake the original strategic cultural value system. 
Yet, the time and the process of the change are gradual, and the deeply held beliefs 
or what I define as the “core value" tends to endure and resistant to change. 
Therefore, it should be very careful to identify which strategic thinking is dominant 
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in a particular period of time, and only by locating in this criterion can we say such 
thought represents the strategic culture of a nation in a certain period of time. 
Thirdly, this study agrees what Tsang has proposed in his research, that it is 
possible that the strategic culture of a nation can have more than one paradigm. 
These paradigms could exist in different level, which are able to affect the outcome 
of behavior respectively. Furthermore, if these paradigms are in opposition to each 
other in nature, it is very possible that the state could not act smoothly to decide its 
security policy that is based on the logic of rational calculation. In this research, I 
will demonstrate how different paradigms inside strategic culture that exists in 
ruling and social level has affected the outcome of Japan's policy option in overseas 
dispatch. 
Figure 2.1. How Statist Military Logic and Strategic Culture Work Together 
Strategic Culture as a context Instrumentality 
(Bounded Rationality) (The Mode of Strategic , Interest , , Policy 
n . 、，.” T . K _ \ Use of Power) _ \ � 
Statist Military Logic _ _ _ \ Rationality > s � � B e h a v i o r U - y l N - i 
— 
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Figure 2.2. How Strategic Culture Works 
Strategic Culture as a context Instrumentality 
(Bounded Rationality) Strategic Interest (The Mode of Policy 
H M m ^ Rationality • • s I B Use of Power) Behavior 
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Strategic Culture and Postwar Japan 
In this research, the concept of strategic culture will be used to explain the 
central research question. The theory of strategic culture in this research would have 
suggest that Japan had a different policy responses in terms of overseas dispatch to 
the US-initiated wars in 1991 and 2001 is because the paradigm inside strategic 
culture which consists of self-image and the identity to Japan's role on the military 
affairs in both ruling and social level in these two periods was different. To test my 
hypothesis, two cases will be examined in this research in comparative angle. They 
are Japan's policy response in terms of overseas dispatch during Gulf Crisis in 1990-
91 and September 11 terrorism crisis in 2001. 
The study of the two cases requires a cautious research design. Firstly, the 
source of Japanese strategic culture in both ruling and social level in early postwar 
era need to be clarified, which aims at preventing the research moving towards the 
trap of tautology, the criticism that is often used to question the reliability and 
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validity of cultural theory. Then in both the two empirical cases, two steps of 
investigation are taken. First, the self-image and collective identity regarding the 
security affairs in both ruling and social level before the outbreak of the two crises 
will be identified. In this part, focus will be put on investigating the congruence of a 
particular strategic thinking to the defense policy of the ruling LDP, the attitudes of 
the JSP and the masses. Analysis in this part would largely depend on the manifested 
statements of policy by different parties, and surveys on security affairs among the 
masses. Finally, detailed decision-making process inside the Japanese government 
towards the two crises w ill be investigated, w hich aims to show the influences of 
strategic culture to the policy behavior. In sum, the research objectives of this thesis 
are: 
1. To identify the sources of the Japanese strategic culture in different level in 
postwar era 
2. To investigate the nature of strategic culture (e.g. identities and self-image to 
the national security affairs) that is shared in the ruling and social level before 
the international crisis breakout. 
3. To assess the effects of strategic culture on Japan's policy response regarding 
to the overseas dispatch of the SDF during the two crises. 
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Objects of Analysis 
To identify the sources of strategic culture in postwar Japan and the different 
identities and self-images in the two cases, it is also necessary to clarify the object of 
analysis in the research. The main focus will be on the writings, thoughts and words 
of Japanese strategists and national political elites. 
Japan is a very different case if compared with China. In the long military 
history of Japan, it is hard to find any military classics, which can reflect a systematic 
and abstract strategic doctrine to its security environment. This is partly because 
Japan is an island nation, which has been isolated geographically from the Asian 
continent for a long time. Therefore, there have been no needs for Japanese leaders to 
construct a well-organized strategic thinking on its national defense. As a result, even 
in the height of the Second World War, it was found that Japan's grand strategy was 
strange, particularly for the strategies adopted by the Imperial Army and the Navy, 
which was absolutely contradicted to each other. Owing to this reason, the Japanese 
strategic thinking before 1945 could not be relied on to explain Japan's postwar 
defense policy in this research. 
To clarify the sources of strategic culture in postwar Japan, I will firstly identify 
the dominant strategic thinking in the ruling level of postwar Japan: the "Yoshida 
Doctrine". This part of analysis would be largely based on the memoir of Yoshida 
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Shigeru, the Japanese Prime Minister in late 1940s and early 1950s, and also the 
recent relevant studies by Chinese scholars?. Then, the dominant strategic thinking in 
the social level: the Pacifism will also be examined based on the relevant studies in 
the field of Japanese Pacifism. 
In the 1990-91 case, the analysis would be based on a secondary data from the 
area study research conducted by Kenneth Pyle, an American Japanese specialist. In 
his r esearch c onducted i n 1 982，h e i dentified f our d ifferent s trategic t houghts t hat 
existed among Japanese elites since 1970s，which includes the expectations to 
Japan's security role in the future. In this part, two thoughts out of four were 
reflected in the two dominant paradigms inside the Japanese strategic culture that are 
shared by Japanese political elites and the masses in both ruling and social level, 
which confirms the existence of the gap between the two paradigms in the Japanese 
strategic culture during those periods of time. 
In the 2001 case, since the pacifist thought dramatically declined in 1990s, the 
notion of the "Normal Nation" would be carefully investigated. Ozawa Ichiro, the 
former LDP leader, firstly proposed this idea in his book titled Blue Print for a new 
Japan. In the book, he explains the criteria of being a "Normal Nation", and the ways 
that the Japanese leaders should act in order to achieve this goal. Some observers 
7 For the relevant sources, please see Xu (2001). 
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believe that the security policy during the Obuchi cabinet between 1998 and 2000 
was guided by the notion of the "Normal Nation"^ therefore it would be appropriate 
to choose this book as the object of analysis for investigating the paradigms of the 
Japanese strategic culture in the two levels for the second case. 
2,4 Research Methods and the Data 
So, how could we extract the identity and self-image from the thinking of 
Japanese political elites and masses, which in order to reflect the Japanese strategic 
culture regarding to the national security affairs in a certain period of time? Dealing 
with this problem, the major research method that will be used in this study is 
"content analysis", or more specifically, "symbolic analysis". 
Content analysis, according to Newman, is "a technique for gathering and 
analyzing the content of text. The content refers to words, meanings, pictures, 
symbols, ideas, themes, or any message that can be communicated. The text, is 
anything written, visual, or spoken that serves as a medium for 
communication."(Newman，1999，p.292). In this research, symbolic analysis, a 
more specific f orm of content analysis suggested by Johnston would be adopted. 
According to Johnston's explanation, "symbols are the vehicles through which 
cultural norms (i.e. share rules, axioms, preferences, etc.) become engaged, 
8 For this observation, please see: Masuzoe, Yoichi (1999)，"Obuchi Extends His Coalition ", in Japan 
Echo, Vol.26, No.5 (October), pp. 18-20 
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activated, or manifested empirically, such that culture can be communicated, 
learned, or contested"(Johnston, 1995a, p.50). By using this method, I expect to 
search out what the dominant strategic thinking (strategic culture) that appears to be 
telling the Japanese political elites to do or not to do on the security affairs (or to be 
more specific, the issue of alliance relations, the use of force and overseas dispatch 
of the Japanese armed forces). 
The principle databases that this research will be used are mainly the 
secondary materials available from the U.S., China and Japan. For the parts of 
strategic culture, as mentioned in the previous part, the object of analysis would rely 
on the books and memoirs written by the key politicians and strategists, and also, 
the works written by other scholars in the field of Japanese Studies. For the policy 
part, thanks to the scholars, newspapers and the researchers from government 
research group^ in Japan and the US, many excellent and insightful articles, surveys, 
polls, researches and books on Japan's response in Gulf crisis and September 11山 
attack in both Japanese and English has been published. Therefore, this part of 
research would primarily rely on this kind of sources. 
9 Such as the surveyors in the Japan Prime Minister Office. 
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Chapter Three 
The Dual Sources of Strategic Culture in Postwar Japan 
Japan's security policy in the postwar era is often portrayed as a process of 
bandwagoning to the strongest nation, or the emergence of a new peace nation. 
However, such interpretations can be challenged by enigmas with contradicting facts. 
Question could be asked like: Why did Japan establish its own armed forces 
(although Japan called it as Self-Defense Forces) even it had enacted a so-called 
Peace Constitution that prohibits Japan from developing its war potential? Why the 
Japanese government was reluctant to build up its own armed forces in early 1950s 
under the request from the United States? Why had the Japanese government set 
dozens of defense constraints, which undermine Japan's security responsibilities that 
stipulates in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty? 
Since 1945, Japan has been keeping a low profile in the international politics, 
particularly in the area of military affairs. We often see that Japan's foreign and 
security policy tends to follow the policies of what United States advocates. Yet, 
bandwagoning to the U.S. does not mean that Japan has no autonomy in security 
affairs at all; Japan did not declare a well articulated strategic doctrine also does not 
mean that the leadership in Japan has no strategic thinking. In fact, bandwagoning 
39 
itself is a strategy that was consciously adopt by the Japanese conservative 
government soon after the country was defeated in 1945, even though on the other 
hand, many other political forces throughout the country resisted to accept it. 
The foundation of this c hapter i s b uilt u pon t he d iscussion m entioned a bove. 
Before elaborating the relations between the SDF's overseas dispatch and strategic 
culture, this chapter aims at identifying the source of strategic culture in postwar 
Japan. It begins with a brief introduction to the major paradigm in the Japanese 
strategic culture in the ruling level: the Yoshida Doctrine, and the paradigm in the 
social level: the Pacifism. The public opinion towards the security a ffairs in early 
postwar era will also be analyzed in this part. Then, the interaction of these two 
paradigms on the defense policy in early postwar era will be examined. It is hoped 
that the chapter will provide a background for an understanding of the relations 
between the strategic culture and Japan's security policy in terms of overseas 
dispatch. 
3,1 Paradigm in the Ruling Level: 
Yoshida Doctrine 
The Yoshida Doctrine is the national strategy centered on a close U.S.-Japan 
alliance, minimal military rearmament, and a focus on economic recoverylo. It was a 
10 In fact, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was not the first LDP leader that advocated the "economic 
oriented, non-military" strategic thinking. According to the memoir written by General Douglas 
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major paradigm that is shared mainly by the LDP, the political elites in the ruling 
level of Japan. 
The Essence of Yoshida Doctrine 
After retired from his official post in 1954，Yoshida wrote several books to 
review his political experience and e xplain his own visions to the development of 
Japan in the future. From many of these books, Yoshida explicitly expresses his 
strategic thinking to Japan's foreign and security policy. By reading these books, we 
can have a grasp of the essence of the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine". 
In many of his memoirs, a word called "diplomatic sense", which Yoshida 
believes is an important capability that every great Japanese leader should command, 
was mentioned for several times. According to Yoshida, Colonel Edward House, the 
personal adviser on the international affairs to US president Woodrow Wilson during 
the First World War, firstly introduced the term of "diplomatic sense" to him. In 
Yoshida's understanding, the statement refers to "a faculty to understand the 
international situation at any givenmoment was vital to the formulation of sound 
foreign policy" (Yoshida, 1973，p.l). 
By applying this idea to Japan's foreign and security policy after the war, firstly, 
Macarthur published in 1966，the Prime Minister in 1946, Shidehara Kichurou, firstly suggested that 
Japan should become a pacifist country that renounces war as a sovereign right o f the nation. For 
details, see lokibe (1999), p.45 and Koseki (2001), p.24. 
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Yoshida stresses that Japan's alliance with the Axis powers in the Second World War 
was totally a tragedy. He believes that "Japan should have achieved a leading 
position among the nations of the world by pursuing her policy of alliance with Great 
Britain and the friendship with the United States throughout the Meiji and Taisho 
periods" (Yoshida, 1973，p.7). Then, Yoshida further contends that it is very 
important for the Japanese people to identify the United States as Japan's most 
important ally, rather than an adversary after the end of war. As Yoshida states in his 
memoir, it is stupid to think that ally with the U.S. would sacrifice Japan's own 
independence. He uses the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1922) as an example: 
"At the time of the signing of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great Britain was at 
the height of her power and the mistress of the seven seas, while Japan was 
an insignificant island nation in the Far East which had only just begun its 
rise from obscurity, the difference in international significance and power 
potential-between the two countries was far greater than the differences 
which exist between Japan and the United States today. Yet the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance was welcomed by government and people alike and no 
one view that document as meaning that Japan was truckling to British 
imperialism or in any danger of becoming a glorified British colony 
(Yoshida, 1973，p.4). 
Yoshida obviously places reliance on that the U.S.-Japan alliance as the key formula 
for the revitalization of Japan. He further claims that “ the maintenance of close 
bonds of friendship with the United States, based upon a deep mutuality of interests, 
must be one of the pillars of Japan's fundamental foreign policy and always remain 
so，，(Yoshida, 1973, p.8). In his memoir, he expresses his perception to the world 
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order by using his own "diplomatic sense": 
"...Japan is an island-nation in which a population in excess of ninety-one 
million must be provided with a civilized standard of life. This can only be 
accomplished through an expanding volume of overseas trade. That we 
should, to that end, pay our special regard to our relations with Great Britain 
and the United States, two countries that are economically the most powerful, 
and technologically the most advanced, nations of the earth, and out dealing 
with whom go back deep into history, is a matter of prudent national policy 
unconnected with any considerations of political ideology (Yoshida, 1973， 
P.8). 
The essence of this Yoshiada Doctrine is more than bandwagoning to the United 
States. It was a grand instruction of what Japan should and should not do. On the 
military affair, Yoshida suggests that the approach of rearmament of Japan should 
be incremental .In one of his books titled the Yoshida Memoirs, he suggests that it 
would be inappropriate for Japan to rebuild its armed forces in the early postwar 
era as the necessary wealth and psychological background in Japan was lacking 
after the Second World War. He writes as follows: 
“ I declared in my policy speech in delivered at the opening of fifteenth 
session of Diet, following the formation of my fourth cabinet in October 1952, 
that Japan should naturally reinforce its defense power as the nation's 
economy recovered, but that the time had not yet arrived, by any means, to 
consider the rearmament" (Yoshida, 1973，p.149). 
Yoshida's view on the way of rearmament was also well clarified in another book 
called Sekai to Nihon (The World and Japan) published in 1963. It exhibits that in the 
very early day after the end of Second World War, Yoshida had articulated a long 
term and well-organized strategic plan for Japan's revival in the future. He writes: 
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It was not economically, socially or intellectually possible for Japan to set 
about rearming itself.. .during my administration. As I think about all that 
followed, I have come to have many misgivings about the current state of 
Japanese defense. My view at the time was that we should leave our defense 
mainly to our American ally and that we should put all our effort into 
recovering our prewar strength and improving the harsh lives of our people. 
However, both the domestic and international environments have since 
changed significantly. Economically, we have overcome the need to rely on 
foreign aid and are even able to assist the world's developing nations. Does it 
not seem that we are already past the stage when we should be depending on 
another nation's might in the realm of defense? I have come to think so. 
In my frequent travels overseas, and particularly during my recent trips 
to Europe and America, I have had the opportunity to look at the nations of 
the free world and to have discussions with their leaders. These countries had 
already overcome the wounds of war, and I was impressed by the fact that all 
of them are trying to assume responsibility for contributing to peace and 
prosperity of the world as a whole. I have come to the conclusion that Japan 
too must assume that responsibility and resolve to contribute to the free world. 
. . . E v e n a Japan that stands in the world's top ranks economically, 
technically and scholastically will remain something of a crippled nation if it 
remains dependent on others for its own defense. It is a position that cannot 
be respected in international diplomatic circles (Ozawa, 1993，pp.98-99). 
In sum, the marrow of the Yoshida Doctrine could be concluded in two 
dimensions. One is in terms of alliance relationship. Yoshida suggests that Japan 
should rely on its alliance with the United States, the most powerful nation for 
defending its national security. Based on this security arrangement, Japan could 
concentrate its limited resources on economic recovery. The other dimension is in 
terms of legitimacy of use of force. Although the Peace Constitution prohibits Japan 
from maintaining war potential, Yoshida basically does not deny Japan's right of 
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using force, particularly in the situation of self-defense ‘ ‘. However, the most 
important issue he concerns is the way of rearmament. In his doctrine, an incremental 
approach towards rearmament was proposed. Following this principle, Yoshida 
asserts that in the early recovery stage, Japan should keep a low profile in 
international politics and avoid spending its limited resources in rearmament or being 
embroiled into any "high politics" (international security conflict). In other words, 
the Peace Constitution has also served as a legal weapon against the U.S. pressure to 
Japan for rearmament. As Yoshida has once told Miyazawa Kiichi, who became the 
Japanese Prime Minister later in 1993，"it is indeed our Heaven-bestowed good 
fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution 
gives us a perfect justification. The politicians who wanted amend it are fools"(Green, 
2001，P.12). 
The Impact of Yoshida Doctrine 
The impact of the Yoshida Doctrine among Japanese political elites in the ruling 
level goes without saying. As Michael Green, an Japanese specialist in the United 
States describes, the Yoshida Doctrine was the only foreign policy paradigm that 
would accommodate the broad demands made by former economic leaders (zaibatsu), 
‘ ‘ In fact, Yoshida had a different interpretation towards the concept of "war" which is prohibited by 
the Article 9 of Constitution. Before 1954，Yoshida noted that Japan should be prohibited involving 
into a both an aggressive war and defensive war. But after the establishment of SDF, he changed his 
mind by admitting the right of self-defense was not precluded in the Article 9. 
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anti-communists, pacifists and other interest groups, into a platform for 1 ong-term 
conservative rule (Green, 2001, p. 11). In the past 50 years, this paramount strategic 
formula was strongly canonized by Yoshida's successors---not only those who have 
been fostered by Yoshida in the political circle, and also the politicians from the 
opposition factions and parties. 
The centrality of the strategic dependence on the United States has never been 
amended. Instead, Japanese leadership has been keeping their efforts to buildup a 
stronger and balance alliance relationship between the two nations. For example, 
Hatoyama Ichiro, who was prime minister of Japan in 1956, attempted to normalize 
the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This has usually been regarded as 
Japan's first step for seeking its diplomatic autonomy, however, such adjustment did 
not undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance. Another example is the signing of the U.S.-
Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960. Kishi Nobusuke, the 
prime minister who has been regarded as a right wing nationalist, strongly advocated 
the revise of the security treaty. This treaty not only removed the clause that gives the 
United States a right to intervene Japan's internal security, but also further reaffirm 
the necessity of maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance - the one of the most important 
principles in Yoshida Doctrine. The most dramatic event that has revealed the 
predominant influence of the US-first and minimum self-defense principle in the 
46 
Yoshida Doctrine, is the recognition of the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
the SDF by Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in 1994. Starting from that moment, the U.S. 
centrality principle and the necessity of SDF has become the "common sense" shared 
by almost all Japanese politicians. 
3,2 Paradigm in the Social Level: 
Pacifism 
The pacifist thought {heiwa shiso) is another source of strategic culture in 
postwar Japan even before the end of World War Two. It refers to the ideas of 
"peaceful coexistence" and "unarmed neutrality", which was mainly shared by the 
opposition parties (mainly Japan Socialist Party) and the masses in the social level. 
The Rise of Pacifism 
According to Bamba and Howes, the Japanese pacifist thought was not 
originated in 1947, but could be traced back to the Meiji era in the century. Their 
main idea of Japanese Pacifism was absorbed from the two strands of modem 
Japanese thought, Christianity and Socialism, which were spread in Meiji and Showa 
Period by missionaries and socialists (Bamba and Howes, 1978, pp.11-33). In the 
Second World War, the Japanese Pacifist thought was severely suppressed by the 
militarism government. As the disastrous war came to end in 1945, the reform 
program advocated by the Allied Occupation forces provided a golden chance for the 
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revival of Japanese Pacifism. 
Starting from early post war era, the pacifist thought had a profound influence 
throughout the country. According to Hook's study on Japanese peace thought, the 
statements made by one of the influential pacifist organizations - Peace Issue 
Discussion Group {Heiwa Mondai Danwakai) between 1949 and 1950, could be 
regarded as a key indicator for observing the nature and the development of Japanese 
pacifism. These statements include: “Statement on war and peace by Japanese 
scientist", "Statement on the peace treaty problem by the Peace Issue Discussion 
Group", “On peace，for the third time". The one of the major characters as Hook 
concludes from these statements is the "peaceful coexistence" and "unarmed 
neutrality"(Hook, 1996). 
Contrast to the traditional realistic view towards national security, Danwakai 
believes that the military competition between the Western bloc lead by the United 
States and the Eastern bloc lead by the Soviet Union was a result of subjective 
judgment, rather than an objective reality. In the nuclear age, they suggest that it 
would be very possible for countries being destroyed by weapons of mass destruction. 
Therefore, they contend that the idea of peaceful coexistence and unarmed neutrality, 
which emphasized on the possibilities of cooperation between states based on trust, 
rather than military preparation for deterrence. Besides, Danwakai also proposed that 
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the Japanese government should encourage cooperation with the two blocs and make 
no enemy on either side (Hook, 1996，pp.31-34) 
Danwakai's view towards Japan's security affair is also reflected in their 
perception to the war-renouncing clause in the Constitution imposed by General 
Douglas Mac Arthur and the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP)^^. 
The Article 9 of the constitution states: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim ofthe preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right 
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 
In Danwakai's perspective, the prohibition of preserving military force stipulated in 
the Constitution is not a humiliation to Japan，but provides a valuable chance for 
Japan to achieve the goal of "bring about harmony between the two worlds" in the 
nuclear age. In other words, the ideal of peace, in the eyes of Japanese pacifists, 
should be the ultimate value that prevents disastrous war from breaking out once 
again (Hook, 1996，pp.34-37). 
The pacifist thought could also be represented by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
which was found in November 1 945 and has shown its flag clearly that the p arty 
opposes any move to rebuilding the armed forces and military alliance. One of its 
12 The war-renounce article is actually proposed by former Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara 
Kichuro. For the details, see Koseki (2001). 
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propositions over the security issue is known as the "three peace principles", which 
is exactly commensurate to the peace thought proposed by the Peace Issue 
Discussion Group. These three principles are: 1) A peace treaty with all the 
belligerent power, rather than signing the treaty only with those anti-communism 
countries. 2) Permanent neutrality. 3) No military bases to be given to the foreign 
power. In 1951，when General Mac Arthur asked the Yoshida government to rebuild 
Japan's own defense force as the US troops in Japan was about to be deployed in the 
Korean peninsular to deal with the North Korean invasion, the JSP exhibited its 
strong opposition stand by adding one more principle: “opposition to the 
rearmament" to the original three peace principles (Hrebenar, 1992，p.89) 
In sum, the Pacifist thought positions itself on the same line with the spirit of 
anti-militarism Peace Constitution and consistently advocates the anti-rearmament 
and pacifist movement. Therefore, in the eyes of the JSP and other pacifists, the 
incremental building up of the SDF and the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Alliance 
are unacceptable, which is just oppositional to the Yoshida Doctrine in the ruling 
level. 
The Limited Pacifism in the Mass Society 
Conventional perception tends to believe that the attitude of the masses in Japan 
towards the rearmament is negative in the postwar era. However, such generalization 
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is not entirely accurate. The attitude of general public towards the military affairs in ‘ 
Japan does show its strong rejection towards the use of forces for military purpose, 
but these attitudes are far more flexible if compared with the principles proposed by 
the Pacifist thought. 
According to the polls conducted by the two major newspapers- Asahi Shimbun 
and Yomiuri Shimbun between 1951 and 1953， people who supported the 
establishment of the SDF were more than those who opposed it (see Figure 3.1 and 
3.2). However, the majority of those people who agree the necessity of the 
rearmament are not incrementalists, but more passive in nature. The polls by Yomiuri 
shows that they tend to view the primary job of the SDF as for self-defense and 
internal security, rather than conducting operation overseas for military purpose'^ 
This result revealed that the Japanese general public opinion was cautious to the 
issue of use of force. 
13 The Asahi Shimbun conducted the polls on March 1952 and June 1953. The Yomiuri Shimbun 
conducted the polls on January 195 land February 1952. 
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The Neccessity of Rearmament 
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Figure 3.1 The Necessity of Rearmament 
Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, March 1951 
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Figure 3.2 Why do you support the rearmament? 
Sources: Yomiuri Shimbun, March 1951 
3.3 The Interaction Between the Two Paradigms on Policy 
Comparing the two types o f paradigm mentioned before, it is found that both o f 
them actually share a common factor in the early postwar era. That is: Both o f them 
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agree that Japan should renounce the right of having armed forces. However, such 
consensus was soon destroyed when the Korean War broke out in 1950. Under the 
pressure from Washington, Yoshida and his ruling party finally made a compromise 
on the issue of rearmament, which was then not the original plan they intended to 
implement for reviving Japan. Starting from that moment, as Keddell describes: the 
Japanese defense policy was "designed more to manage conflicting U.S. and 
domestic political pressures than to relate to the international balance 
forces"(Keddell, 1993，p. 170). In other words, from the day of the establishment of 
the SDF, the Yoshida Doctrine has started its process of evolution. In the following 
years, his successors has been endeavoring to survive between the U.S. pressures and 
checks from the socialists and pacifists, hoping to normalize Japan's defense status 
step by step. 
Yoshida's adjusted attitude towards the use of forces came to the surface when 
he decided to build a quasi-military force in early 1950s. This decision was directly 
caused by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. According to Yoshida's memory, 
he received an urgent communication from General MacArthur in July 1950，which 
ordered Japan to establish an additional police force for internal security in Japanese 
homeland, as the US occupied forced was ready to move into the battlefield in 
Korean peninsula. Yoshida accepted the order and two quasi-military forces: Police 
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Reserve Force {Keisatsu Yobitai) and Maritime Police Reserve Force {Kaijo Keibitai) 
were established in 1950 and 1952 respectively. 
Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Yoshida had been considering inviting 
the U.S. troops to station in Japan. However, Washington did not intend to provide a 
full military shield if Tokyo does not build its own armed forces. In early 1951，John 
Foster Dulles, the special advisor of the U.S. State Department, made clear that due 
to the Vandenberg Resolution^"^, Japan had to build its own defense forces if it wishes 
to have the U.S. commitment in its defense. He suggested that Japan should expand 
its defense forces into ten divisions with 350,000 soldiers (Maswood, 1990;Wong 
and Wu, 2003;Tanaka, 1997). These suggestions implied that Washington hopes 
Tokyo to be responsible to its own defense, and not being fully relied on the 
deterrence provided by the U.S. troops. Facing this reality, Yoshida eventually 
compromised by promising to strengthen the defense forces of Japan. The U.S.-Japan 
Security Treaty was finally signed soon after the endorsement of San Francisco 
Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951. In 1954，the Defense Agency Establishment Bill 
and the Self-Defense Force Bill were introduced to the Diet. Both laws were finally 
enacted on July 1954. At that point, a compromise was made by Yoshida to 
expand the ground force to 152,110 (ten divisions), aiming to a size of 
14 The Vandenberg Resolution stipulated that the United States could only enter into collective security 
arrangements i f these were firmly based o n the p rinciples o f e ffective s elf-help and mutuality. S ee 
Maswood(1990),p.29; Wong and Wu (2003),p.52. 
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180,000(Keddell, 1993，p.33). 
Meanwhile, at the domestic level, Yoshida and his successors also agreed to set 
defense constraints after the establishment of the U.S.-Japan security framework and 
the S DF. It was not 0nly a m easure for diversifying and smoothing the resistance 
from the opposite pacifist�5，but also a gate for preventing the leaders in Washington 
from demanding too much on Japan's security arrangement. In 1950, in replying to 
questions in the Diet about the establishment of the National Police Reserve Force, 
the predecessor of the SDF, Yoshida stated that "the purpose of the new force was 
restricted to the maintenance of law and order within the country, and that no such 
thing as a step towards rearmament was being contemplated"(Yoshida, 1971, p. 193). 
In 1952, Yoshida was once again being questioned about the possibility of military 
forces being dispatched overseas under the name of the United Nations, he asserted 
that "the cooperation with the United Nations was only possible for Japan in so far as 
it was compatible with our Constitution, treaty commitments, and the 1 aws o f o u r 
country in general; that beyond that point, the United Nations could not ask us to 
undertake any commitments, nor did we have any obligation to do so"(Yoshida, 1971, 
p . 194). 
15 According to Keddell, The constraints are set up for "smoothing" the passages of Self-Defense 
Force Bill and Defense Agency Establishment Bill and for avoiding trouble in US-Japan relations as 
US pressured Japan to sign the Mutual Security Act (MSA), which would provide more military aid to 
Japan. See Keddell(1993), pp.32-35. 
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Following this basic principle, a series of defense constraints were created 
throughout the Cold War era. These constraints include: The Ban on Overseas 
Dispatch in 1954;The Ban of Exercising the Right of Collective Self-Defense 
between 1956 and 1959; The Ban on Arms Exports and the Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles^^ in 1967 under Sato Eisaku cabinet; The One Percent Ceiling of gross 
national product (GNP) on Defense Expenditures in 1976 under Miki Takeo cabinet. 
In short, the establishment of the SDF in the early postwar era reveals the 
interaction between the two paradigms in the Japanese strategic culture. On the one 
hand, the Pacifists wanted to set constraints to limit the speed of the rearmament and 
the function of the SDF. On the other hand, Yoshida wanted to resist U.S. further 
request on rearmament by compromising with the Pacifist and constructing various 
defense constraints. Yoshida himself has never intended to expand the scope of use of 
force, nor intended to advocate Japan's military forces involving in any international 
conflict in the early postwar era, except the political impacts of the military operation 
would be helpful in strengthening the U.S.-Japan relations, which can further benefit 
Japan to achieve its long term strategic objectives'^. 
16 The Three Non-Nuclear Principles was firstly declared by Prime Minister Sato in Lower House 
Budget Committee hearing in December 1967, which refers to the principles of "not possessing 
nuclear weapons, not producing them or not permitting their introduction in Japan". For the details, 
please see the website of Japan Defense Agency (English Version): http://www. ida.go.ip/e/index .htm 
17 In fact, Yoshida had secretly sent 46 minesweepers manned by 1200 men under the Maritime 
Guard Force to South Korean ports in October 1950 for mine clearing purpose. The operation was 
requested by the United States and finally resulted in the sinking of two minesweepers and death of 
one Japanese and injuries to eight others. According to Xu's research, this decision was due to 
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3,4Summary 
The source of strategic culture in postwar Japan was basically derived from the 
two strategic thinking shared by the ruling LDP and the opposition parties mainly 
represented by JSP and the masses. Apparently, the two paradigms seem similar as 
both of them object the necessity of armed forces in the early postwar era，but in a 
nutshell, they view Japan's security from a different perspective. 
The idea of Yoshida Doctrine is basically a strategy of buying time and security 
insurance through temporary sacrificing Japan's sovereignty in terms of defense. It is 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The conservative government has never 
intended to restart the process of rearmament in the early post war era, nor truly 
willing to embrace the pacifist ideal. Therefore, they accepted a moderate use of 
force for self-defense. In contrast, the Pacifist thought perceives Japan's security 
from a normative perspective, hoping that the Peace Constitution could provide an 
opportunity for Japan to create a new security identity. As a result, the use of force, 
particularly under the condition of preparing military conflict under the name of state, 
is absolutely unacceptable to the followers of Pacifist thought (See Table 3.1). 
Yoshida's intention on strengthening the US-Japan relations, as in late 1950，the U.S. government 
started to consider taking the defense burden of Japan. For the details, please see Xu (2001), Tanaka 
(1997)，pp.78-80 and Katzenstein(1993),p.l60. 
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^ ^ ^ - - ^ ^ ^ I n t e n s i t y of Use of Force 
^ r � H i g h Moderate Low Types of Strategic 
The Yoshida Doctrine US - Japan Alliance 
Minimal Self Defense 
The Pacifist Thought Unarmed Neutrality 
Peace Co-existence 
Table 3.1 The Difference of Two Paradigms in terms of Intensity of Use of Force 
In the reality, the ruling LDP has closely controlled the direction of defense 
policy development. As LDP has been the majority in the Diet for almost fifty years, 
the adjustment of security policy is a compromise with a firm direction. The 
establishment of the various defense constraints since early postwar era was, indeed, 
not solely as Keddell argued, for reducing and smoothing the resistance of the 
socialist left on the incremental defense buildup, but also for achieving a greater 
long-term strategic goal of national recovery. What the Socialist Left could only do is 
to try their best to check the speed of defense policy adjustment proposed by LDP. 
Once they gained enough votes in the Diet, the gap between the two paradigms 
instantly appeared on the surface. 
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Chapter Four 
Japan's Responses to the Gulf Crisis: 
The Gap ofthe Two Paradigms 
(1990-91) 
Starting from late 1960s, different political and intellectual elites in Japan began to 
bring up different views on Japan's long-term national strategy (includes security 
strategy), which stimulated an extensive debate throughout the country. Still, 
Yoshida Doctrine, the dominant paradigm in the ruling level, and the Pacifism, the 
paradigm that was widely shared in the social level, showed their vitality. Following 
this development, these two paradigm, which is oppositional in nature, not only 
influenced the security thinking among Japanese political elites throughout 1 980s, 
but also directly shaped Japan's defense policy behavior when international crises, 
such as the Gulf War in 1991，suddenly broke out. 
In this chapter, I argue that Japan's reluctant policy responses in terms of 
overseas dispatch o f t h e SDF during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91 was due to the gap 
between the two paradigms. The contest of these two types of paradigm before and 
during the Gulf crisis was one o f the crucial reasons that delayed Japan's response to 
the crisis, and it made the Japanese government almost impossible to join the 
international multinational forces against Iraq in 1991，despite the probability of 
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involving into a direct combat seems very little. 
4,1 Searching for a New Identity: Four Views to Japan，s Security 
Since the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were 
signed in 1951, Japan's foreign policy, as well as its security policy, was primarily 
guided by the Yoshida Doctrine. Under the influence of the persistent strategic 
thinking, Japan took its preoccupation with the economic recovery, maintained a 
minimum defense forces and adhered its defense policy closely with the military 
shield provided by the United States. The benefit of this security arrangement was 
apparent. Japan successfully rebuilt its national power in terms of economy within 
thirty years after the end of the Second World War. Until 1980s, Japan had already 
become the second largest economic power that just behind the United States. 
Meanwhile, different views to Japan's future security status were also raised 
during these decades. Kenneth Pyle, one of the influential Japanese specialists in the 
United States, has once made an insightful generalization to these notions. In his 
monograph published in 1982, he outlines the four different views to Japan's security 
shared by different groups of Japanese intellectual and political elites, which gives an 
integrated broad overview to Japan's self-image in terms of security between late 
1960s and early 1980s. 
The first group of elites, according to Pyle's analysis, is called "the progressive". 
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This group of people is "emerged out of the w ar-time disillusion, revulsion from 
Japanese nationalism, and profound distrust of traditional state power", who believe 
the anti-militaristic pacifism is the appropriate road for the new Japan (Pyle, 1982, 
p.242). Accordingly, this group of people supports the Article 9 of Peace Constitution, 
opposing the possession of any arms such as the SDF and claims that “ it was Japan's 
unique mission in the postwar world to demonstrate that a modem industrial nation 
could exist without arming itself, that Japan could show the way to a new world in 
which national sovereignty would be forswom，，(Pyle，1982, p.243). The advocates of 
this notion, as Pyle quotes in his analysis, includes Maruyama Masao, Kamishima 
Jiro and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, who were all influential intellectual giants in Japan in 
late 1960s. 
The second school is known as "the liberal-realism". This school of thought 
basically agrees to the necessity of a minimum capability for national self-defense, 
and generally put more emphasis on strengthening the U.S.-Japan joint defense 
cooperation. The liberal realists position themselves opposite to the "progressives", 
claims that ‘‘ the institution of the nation-state was not about to disappear, that the 
strength of nationalist feelings was unabated, and that a competition of national 
interests within an environment constantly approaching 'international anarchy' was 
the only realistic way of understanding international politics’’(Pyle，1982, p.247). 
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Based on this assumption, these realists basically reject the so-called "the notion of 
Japanese exceptionalism" or what the former Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi called 
"a special country". For them, the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, the three non-
nuclear principles and the Utopian pacifism is totally unrealistic in international 
politics. One of the advocates of this school, Sase Masamori，who was also a 
professor at the National Defense College, argues that Japan's defense policy since 
1950s has violated the international common sense as it has placed its own security 
under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but at the same time Japan has also refused to allow 
nuclear weapon to be installed in, or passed through Japan (Pyle, 1982, p.249). 
According to Pyle's analysis, the realists' view could be best reflected at the 
national security report issued by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group 
I g 
(Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu gurupu) in Ohara cabinet in July 1980 . The report 
proposed that Japan must replace its original role of “economic giant and political 
d w a r f with an active foreign policy and "a substantial defense establishment that 
would cooperate with the Western allies in the maintenance and management of the 
international system" (Pyle, 1982，p.249). Following this observation, Pyle 
concludes that although the realists are divided according to their attitudes towards 
the Article 9，while some of them suggest to amend the Article 9 but the others prefer 
18 The chairman of this national security research team is Inoki Masamichi, who is the former 
president of the National Defense Academy and the Research Institute for Peace and Security. 
62 
reinterpreting it, the most important consensus has been built among themselves, that 
is, "Japanese rearmament is required for defense purposes and that it is not in 
conflict with Article 9" (Pyle, 1982, p.250). 
The third notion of strategic thinking is shared by a group of elites who are 
classified by Pyle as "the mercantilist". This school of thought argues that "Japan's 
geo-political position, its resources endowments, and the structure of its economy, 
leads inexorably to a conclusion that Japan's nation interests is properly seen as a 
great trading nation" (Pyle, 1982，p.250). One of the advocators of this school, 
Kosaka Masataka, who is also a political scientist, gives a detailed explanation for 
this thinking. He claims “Japan should act the role of a merchant in the world 
communi ty~a middle man taking advantage of commercial relations and avoiding 
involvement i n i ntemational p olitics". In one of his a rticles, h e w rites, "A t rading 
nation (tsusho kokka) does not go to war, neither does it make supreme efforts to 
bring peace. It simply takes advantages of international relations created by stronger 
nations"(Pyle, 1982, p.251). In other words, "the mercantilist" prefers playing the 
role of trader or banker, rather than that of samurai or soldier in international politics. 
Thus, such inclination suggests that Japan should rely its security on the U.S. 
dominant force and concentrate its effort in economic development and trade, rather 
than keeping a high profile on international politics, particularly on the affairs related 
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to military activities. 
The last notion is the "the new nationalism", which is also usually portrayed as 
the right-wing radicals. According to Pyle's analysis, this group of thought strongly 
rejects the view of the progressive and shares some beliefs that are more aggressive 
that the liberal realists. For instance, they also tend to view that “ a competition of 
national interests within a environment constantly verging on 'international anarchy' 
is the only way of understanding international politics’，(Pyle，1982, p.257). However, 
their views to Japan's security are not only about a realistic perception to the world 
order, but also about revitalizing Japan's military power. The notion proposed by 
these new nationalists suggests that Japan should seek a more traditional political and 
military power status in the world, arguing that Japan should not be satisfied with its 
postwar political status and denying that Japan shares the same interests and values 
with the Western allies. Based on this perception, for example, Shimizu Ikutaro, one 
of the influential new nationalists, argues that Japan should not rely its defense on the 
American nuclear deterrence, but should develop its own modem defense and armed 
forces, particularly the nuclear warfare. He claims that a country like Japan that does 
not possess nuclear weapons, would be put political and military pressure like 
"twisting a baby's arm"(Pyle, 1982，p.268). 
The four thinking to Japan's future security between 1960s and 1980s reflected 
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the different political forces ranged from the left to the right in Japan's political 
spectrum. Still, the Yoshida Doctrine and the Pacifist thought exerted its paramount 
influence through “the progressivisms" and “ the liberal realists". It was these two 
paradigms that finally shape Japan's policy response in terms of overseas dispatch to 
the Gulf Crisis in 1990-91. 
4,2 The Two Competing Paradigms in the Eve of the Gulf Crisis 
As a democratic country, Japan's security and defense policy was not solely 
dominated by the governing LDP, but also influenced by the opposition parties in 
the Diet and the masses. As one Japanese scholar writes: “If ever Japan were to 
change her basic orientation and the defense question touches on her constitution---
it would no be because a handful of men swap places at the top... Rather, it would 
be through a protracted and arduous process of gestation and consensus formation 
involving many detours, stops, and starts"(Kataoka, 1980，p.4). 
One schematic way of identifying the nature of Japanese strategic culture in 
1980s is to look at the attitudes, opinions and policy declarations reflected by the 
major political parties and public poils in terms of defense affairs. Stailing from 
1955，as the leaders LDP started to take the office in the ruling level, the JSP also 
began to exert its influence in the Diet and the mass society, which forms a so-
called "1955 system" in Japan. Until 1980s, being backed up by the persistent anti-
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militarism sentiments among the general public, the JSP still remained as the largest 
opposition party in the Diet (See Table 4.1 and 4.2), which forms a strong constraint 
to the security policies proposed by the ruling LDP. This situation reveals that the 
struggles between the two different paradigms in the ruling and social level 
remained within Japan in the 1980s. 
YEAR ITOTAL SEATS ILDP IJSP IKOMEITOIDSP IJCP 
1980 5U "287 T07 34 —33 29 
1983 s i r 286 Too 34 —31 29 
1986 m "258 n o 59 一 37 27 
1989 |512 1295 +84 155 +28 {ll 
Table 4.1: The Distribution of Major Political Parties' Seats in the House of Representatives 
(Lower House) after the Four Elections in 1980s 
Source: The Statistics of Japan {Nihon no Tokei), 1980，1983, 1986，and 1989. Prime Minister Office. 
YEAR iTOTAL SEATS iLDP IJSP IKOMEITOIDSP IJCP 
1980 252 _ 137 47 Yj 12 12 
1983 ^ "l36 43 27 — 13 14 
1986 "l38 42 27 14 ~ 14 
11989 1252 I l lO 172 {21 | lO | l 4 
Table 4.2: The Distribution of Major Political Parties' Seats in the House of Councilors (Upper 
House) after the Four Elections in 1980s 
Source: The Statistics of Japan (Nihon no Tokei), 1980，1983’ 1986，and 1989. Prime Minister Office. 
The Ruling LDP 
The Yoshida Doctrine proved efficient for Japan's postwar national 
reconstruction, which strengthened the continual domination o f the LDP in Japan. 
The LDP's defense policy in 1980s, particularly in Nakasone cabinet between 1983 
and 1987，had a vast progress in military buildup. However, although Nakasone is 
usually portrayed as a hawk inside the LDP on security affairs, the defense policy of 
66 
his cabinet still adhered to the three major principles set by the Yoshida Doctrine or 
the notion of “the liberal-realism" as generalized by Pye. The U.S.-Japan alliance, 
the minimal self-defense and the incremental approach for rearmament, has not been 
changed. 
The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance was one of the important policies 
adopted b y Nakasone administration. When Nakasone Yasuhiro took the office as 
Prime Minister, Japan was facing the increasing pressure from the rapid military 
buildup of Soviet Union and the relative decline of the United States. Nakasone 
understood that the only approach that can defend Japan from Soviet threat is to 
strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and the defensive military buildup in Japan. In his 
own words, Japan and the United States should build a relation called “unmei 
kyodotai” (common destiny). In 1983，Nakasone declared that, 
1. Japan should become an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" that against the 
Soviet “ Backfire" aircraft. 
2. Japan should exercise a full control of the straits and sea surrounding Japan 
which in order to block the passage of the Soviet submarine and ships. 
3. Japan should secure and maintain the sea-lanes to several hundred miles 
and if we can establish this defense, the sea-lanes between Guam and 
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Tokyo and between the Taiwan Strait and Osaka could be secured (Maeda, 
1990，p.265) 
These statements reveal that the defense policy in Nakasone administration was to 
integrate Japan's defense forces into the Western Bloc. Based on this foundation, 
Japan could take more defense responsibilities in U.S.-Japan alliance and seeking 
equal status with the United States. In 1987 and 1988，for the first time, Japan's 
defense expenditure broke the one percent ceiling of the GNP. Japan's navy and air 
forces were rapidly reinforced in quality as advanced fighters and warships have 
been introduced into the SDF. 
To sum up, the defense policy of the governing LDP in the 1980s could be 
regarded as a continuous evolution of the Yoshida Doctrine. The basic principles of 
defense policy set by the previous cabinet have not been adjusted vastly. Conversely, 
these basic rules have been strengthened. The congruence of the LDP's defense 
policy and the "liberal realism" revealed in Pyle's analysis showed that the realist 
thinking adopted in the early post war era still play an important role in Japan's 
ruling level in 1980s. 
The JSP 
On the other hand, JSP's perception to the issue of security is congruence with 
the "progressivism thought" or "Pacifism". In late 1970s，the unarmed neutrality, was 
68 
still the major principle of JSP's defense policy. 
In the following years throughout 1960s, there was a hot debate over the 
security issue inside the JSP. The ideology-oriented left wing, on the one hand, 
contended that the unarmed neutrality, the rejection of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty 
and U.S. troops stationed in Japan should be remained as the party principle over the 
defense affair. The moderates inside the party, on the other hand, argued that the SDF 
was somehow necessary for national defense. They believed that the only thing that 
the JSP needed to do was to limit the power and the size of the SDF, rather than 
questioning its constitutionality. At last, the left wings won the debate. Coupled with 
other disagreements with the left wing, the moderates inside the JSP eventually split 
from the JSP and form a central party called the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). 
Therefore, JSP's defense policy was then continually dominated by the pacifist in the 
subsequent years and its Pacifist character also became one of its major images to the 
Japanese general public in 1970s and 1980s (Keddell, 1994，pp.94-96). 
However, the JSP still had to face the reality. Since the 1970s, the JSP tended to 
focuses more on limiting the speed and scope of Japan's military buildup, rather than 
to question the legitimacy of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, JSP 
accepted the National Defense Program Outline (NOPO) proposed by the LDP in 
1976 as an exchange of putting more defense constraints in the policy. Furthermore, 
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JSP's high-level leadership, such as Ishibashi Masashi, also invented a term called 
"unconstitutional but legal" to reposition JSP's stand over the legitimacy of the SDF. 
The term means that the establishment of the SDF is unconstitutional, but its 
existence is legal because it was built based on Diet legislative procedures. The JSP 
believed that the final abolishment of the SDF should also through legal means, 
which reflected the JSP's limited acceptance to the status quo of Japan's national 
defense (Kedell, 1994，pp.94-96; Matsuzaki, 1989，pp.68-71). 
The Masses: the Continual Influence of Limited Pacifism 
The slight policy adjustment of JSP over defense affairs was largely due to the 
dramatic changes internally in the previous two decades. Starting from late 1970s, 
the surprising success on the economical sector proved that the minimal self-defense 
and the security treaty with the U.S. was a useful national strategy, which increased 
the legitimacy of the LDP. As a result, the public acceptance to the SDF and U.S.-
Japan alliance grew. 
According to the polls conducted by Prime Minister's Office (PMO) between 
1975 and 1984，near 80 percent agreed the necessity of the SDF for Japan (See 
Figure 4.1). This dramatic change inevitably formed a pressure to JSP's rigid anti-
rearmament defense policy. As Keddell says: “ Inflexibility on defense issue in the 
face of increasing public acceptance the SDF and the security treaty was one of the 
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reasons for the JSP's electoral decline from 1960s to late 1980s"(Keddell, 1993, 
p.95). 
Necessity of the Self Defence Force 
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Figure 4.1 The Necessity of the Self -Defense Forces 
Sources: The Prime Minister Office of Japan. See website: http://www8.cao.go.ip/survev/v-
index.html 
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Figure 4.2 Expectations to SDF's Primary Mission 
Sources: The Prime Minister Office of Japan. See website: http://www8.cao.go.ip/survev/v-
index.html 
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Despite the gradual shift of the mass's perception to the SDF and the US-Japan 
alliance, some principles that revealed in the ‘‘Pacifist thought", such as the aversion 
to the use of force under the name of sovereignty, remained in the general public. 
Until 1989, relevant polls showed that the masses still thought that the primary 
mission of the SDF is self-defense or internal security, rather than for military 
purpose (See Figure 4.2). This inclination also finally displayed in the Gulf crisis in 
1990-91. 
4.3 A Strategic Cultural Explanation to the Reluctant Response on 
Overseas Dispatch 
Japan's deliberate reaction in the Gulf crisis in 1990 was a reflection of the 
controversy between the "liberal-realism" and the "progressivism". The fundamental 
difference between the ruling LDP and the JSP that was backed up by the masses 
with anti-militarism sentiments, made no room for compromise on the issue of 
overseas dispatch of the SDF during the crisis. 
The Ban of Overseas Dispatch 
The prohibition of overseas dispatch of the SDF is one of the most important 
constraints stipulated by the Japanese government in 1954. It is also "the first 
Japanese government policy constraint on defense other than the U.S.-imposed peace 
constitution"(Keddell, 1993，p.32). Due to this reason, this defense restraint has long 
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been the thorny subject to the political leaders inside the LDP before the outbreak of 
Gulf crisis in 1990-91. 
Since 1960s, the interpretation of the Ban of Overseas Dispatch has been 
slightly adjusted but without a substantial change. For example, Foreign Minister 
Shiina Etsusaburo and Defense Agency Director Matsuno Raizo sketched a 
distinction between overseas dispatch for purpose of using force (kaigai hahei) and 
overseas dispatch for purpose of peaceful objectives {kaigai haken) in 1966. They 
declared that the former one is confined by the peace constitution but the later one is 
constitutional. In October 1980，Prime Minister Suzuki also confirmed this stance for 
the government (Keddell, 1993，pp.177-178). 
Meanwhile, the Japanese government has been consistently refusing to 
participate in any international military operation, even in the UN-oriented peace 
keeping activities. For instance, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold has 
requested Japan to send the SDF to participate the U.N. peacekeeping missions in 
Lebanon and Congo in 1958 and 1961，Japan refused to join it on the grounds that 
the SDF law did not include UN duties. In September 1965, Japan was also 
informally asked by the United States to send its SDF to Indonesia for peacekeeping 
operation as the country is under upheavals. Once again, the request was denied. In 
1975，The Japanese government also adopted the same response when the United 
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States informally requested Japan to help in its evacuation at Saigon in Vietnam. 
Similarly, between 1987 and 1988, Japan still remained reluctance on this issue when 
the United States asked Japan to send some minesweepers to the Persian Gulf for 
policing operation, which aims at protecting the oil route from the gulf through the 
Strait of Hormuz (Fukushima, 2003, pp.243-244; Katzenstein and Okawara, 
1993,pp. 160-161; Keddell, 1993, p.l77; Woolley, 2000，pp.115-116; Wong and Wu, 
2003’ p.246). 
The r igidity of t he Ban of O verseas D ispatch s hows t he s trength of both the 
Pacifism represented by the opposition party, and the influence of the Yoshida 
Doctrine in the ruling level. Therefore, the Ban of Overseas Dispatch could be 
regarded as a key indicator that could demonstrate the controversy between the two 
paradigms. It was until the end of the Gulf War in 1991，this constraint finally faced 
its first challenge. 
The Struggle of Two Paradigms 
After Kuwait was invaded by Iraq on August 1990，the first response that 
came to the mind of Japanese decision makers was economic measure. These 
measures include: to launch an economic ban on oil and trade to Iraq; to support the 
economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council; to provide an economic 
assistance for refugees relief and countries near Iraq. In the following days between 
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October 1990 and January 1991，the Kaifu Toshiki cabinet pledged a total 
contribution of 13 billion U.S. dollars step by step to the U.S. oriented multinational 
forces, which accounts for 20 percent of the cost of the Gulf War (Rose, 2000，p. 126). 
However, during the seven months of the whole crisis, the Kaifu cabinet was still 
under a huge external and internal pressure. 
Internationally, the United States government and American mass media exerted 
various pressures to government in Tokyo for sending armed forces to Persian Gulf 
against Iraq. For instance, President George Bush called the Prime Minister Kaifu 
Toshiki several times to ask for Japan's assistance against Baghdad in August; The 
U.S. ambassador to Japan, Michael H Armacost, also urged Japan to provide more 
contribution after his meeting with Ozawa Ichiro, the Secretary General of LDP; 
Members of the US Congress and Senate, such as John Mckayne and Richard 
Gephardt, also pressed Japan to provide a substantial contribution to the U.S.-led 
multinational forces; The American media, such as Newsweek, criticized Japan's 
reluctance to provide human contribution in the Gulf Crisis as an approach of buying 
oil with the lives of American soldiers(Hook, 1996, pp.82-83). All of these pressures 
from different sector of the U.S. asked for only one thing: Japan should send its 
troops for assisting the war against Iraq. According to Okamoto Yukio, who was 
Director of the First Division of the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry 
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of Foreign Affairs during the Gulf crisis, the substantial contribution that Washington 
asked Tokyo to provide includes minesweeping operation, dispatch of SDF transport 
ships and planes and sending SDF troops (Okamoto, 2002，p. 11). 
Internally, the liberal realists inside the LDP were also using the foreign 
pressure to persuade the KaifU cabinet to contribute more to the Gulf crisis. 
Immediately after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, as a Prime Minister from a small 
faction inside LDP, which is relatively cautious on security affairs, Kaifu Toshiki did 
not intend to send any Japanese military personnel overseas, but rather prefer to set 
up another organization to deal with the crisis: “at the time I first thought of the 
United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps Bill, the image I had in mind was the Japan 
Overseas Cooperation Volunteers"(Hook, 1996，p.85). Yet, the masters behind the 
government, the Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro, and other hawks like Chairman of 
the LDP's Party General Council Nishioka Takeo, intended to advocate a legislation 
of the United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps Bill (UNPCCB, Kokuren Heiwa 
Kyoryoku An), which would allow the SDF to assist in UN peacekeeping operation in 
the Gulf. Ozawa's active role during the crisis reveals his intention to "took the lead 
in seeking to reshape Japan's relations with the outside world by seizing upon the 
Gulf crisis as an opportunity for the government to reinterpret the scope of SDF 
activities permitted under the Constitution"(Hook, 1996,p.83). In other words, 
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Ozawa sought to pave the road for SDF to participate in the UN military operation 
under the name of "international contribution" without amends the Constitution. This 
motivation was finally proved in Ozawa's own book titled Blueprint for a New Japan, 
In the book, he writes, "How can Japan, which so depends on world peace and 
stability, seek to exclude a security role from its international contribution?"(Ozawa, 
1994，P.95). 
Under the influence from both internal and external pressure, and also with the 
support from the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Kaifu government finally decided to introduce the UNPCCB to the Diet, 
which would allow the SDF to be deployed in the Persian Gulf for carrying out non-
combat mission. Yet, Pacifism, the paradigm mainly shared by the JSP and the 
general public, constrained the bill from being passed. 
In the 1989 election, the LDP lost the majority in the Upper House. This 
situation gave the JSP a golden opportunity to challenge the necessity of legislation 
related to overseas dispatch. The JSP has always been suspicious towards the 
legislation related to defense affairs. They believe that legislation of the UNPCCB 
would erode the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. For instance, on October 
the JSP printed a full-page political advertisement with a headline "No Deployment 
of troops overseas ---the Socialist Party" in all major newspaper (Ito, 1991，p.279); 
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the leader of the JSP, Doi Takako denounced LDP's bill proposal in the Diet as 
follows: 
Why must pacifist Japan take the same action a s military b ig powers, 
going so far as to oppose the ideal of the Constitution? The UN Peace 
Cooperation Corps Bill is the overseas dispatch of military, with the SDF 
dressed in beautiful clothing, which contradicts the government own position 
of regarding this as prohibited by the first clause of Article 9(Hook, 1996, 
P.87). 
Moreover, the public opinion has also shown a negative response to the 
legislation and the overseas dispatch of SDR According to a telephone survey 
conducted by Kyodo News Agency in October 1990，when asked, "What do you 
thinking of dispatching the SDF abroad?", 668 out of 1000 people opposed and only 
129 supported (Ito, 1991，p.280). Similarly, surveys carried out by Asahi Shimbun in 
November 1990 also showed that 78 percent favored a non-military contribution to 
the Allied forces, with nearly 80 percent of those polled opposed the overseas 
dispatch of SDF, 54 percent opposed to the dispatch of civilian peace c ooperation 
organization and 58 percent opposed the UNPCCB legislation (Rose, 2000，p.127; 
Hook, 1996，p.115). In the Asahi polls conducted one month later, only 9% favored 
the overseas dispatch of the SDF. Most of the rest，favored assisting multinational 
forces through financial means, diplomatic efforts and non-military support (See 
figure 4.3). 
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Overseas Dispatch of Self-Defense Force 
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Figure 4.3 Overseas Dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (Asahi Shinbun, Novl990 and Dec 1990) 
Sources: Hook,Glenn D (1996) Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan London ； 
New York : Routledge, pp.114-115. 
Consequently, the negative response to the legislation for overseas dispatch in the 
social level, restrained several small central parties such as Clean Government Party 
(Komeito) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP, Minshu Shakaito) in the Diet 
from supporting the bill. At last, the UNPCCB was repealed in November 1990. 
Japan was finally unable to send any SDF forces to the Gulf and participate in any 
military operations over the span of seven months since the outbreak of the crisis. 
In Sum 
It should not be denied that Japan cannot response to the Gulf crisis by sending 
the SDF overseas was also due to many other factors. These reasons include: weak 
crisis management; struggle in the domestic politics; fail to unite the central party 
before the Diet session closed; uncertainty and anxiety to the new Post C old War 
order and skeptical towards the effectiveness of use of force by the US in the foreign 
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soil (Inoguchi, 1991). However, these interpretations fail to demonstrate the 
fundamental contradiction of the two paradigms in the Japanese strategic culture, 
which was apparently revealed in this crisis. From the complex picture just stated, 
Japan's reluctant response in overseas dispatch to the Gulf crisis could be also 
portrayed as lack of consensus in the domestic level on the issue of how Japan should 
position itself in the international society in terms of security. In this process, due to 
the controversies between the "Liberal Realism" and "Pacifism" paradigms shared 
by different political forces and masses, The Japanese government was unable to 
reach consensus on the issue of overseas deployment of the SDF, which made a 
prompt overseas dispatch of the SDF to the Persian Gulf area almost impossible. It 
was about two months after the end of the war, the LDP's plan for overseas dispatch 
was finally being implemented, which opened the door for a new wave of 
incremental change in Japan's defense policy in the post-Cold War era. 
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Table 4.3 The Chronology of Japan's response in 1990-91 Gulf crisis 
2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait 
5 August Japan announced ban on oil and trade with Iraq 
6 August Japan declared to support economic sanction to Iraq imposed by U N 
Security Council Resolution 661 
7 August United States declared to deploy troops to Saudi Arabia 
29 August Japan announced economic assistance for refugees relief and countries 
near Iraq 
30 August Japan announced providing 1 billion US dollars aid 
14 September Japan announced providing 4 billion US dollars aid 
16 October U N Peace Cooperation Bill was introduced to Japanese Diet 
8 November U N Peace Cooperation Bill was withdrew from Japanese Diet 
29 November U N Security Council set 15 January as deadline for Iraq to withdraw 
from Kuwait 
17 January 1991 Operation Desert Storm started with air strikes 
24 January Japan announced providing 9 billion US dollars aids and willingness to 
use SDF ' s airplane to transport refugees 
24 February Grounds attacks started 
28 February Cease fire 
24 April Japan announced to deploy minesweepers in Persian Gulf 
5 June Japan ' s minesweepering operations started 
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Chapter Five 
Japan's Responses to the Anti-Terrorism War: 
Moving towards An Unitary Paradigm 
(2001) 
Although the pacifist left party controlled the Upper House in early 1990s, which 
prevented the passage of any legislation related to overseas dispatch of the SDF, the 
changing policy and attitude in both ruling and s ocial level after the Gulf War in 
1991 marked a turning point of Japan's security policy, which provided an 
unparalleled opportunity for the emergence of a new paradigm in the Japanese 
strategic culture. This transformation, in fact, also provided an effective perspective 
to understand Japan's responses to the anti-terrorism war in 2001. 
This chapter begins with an introduction of the "new old paradigm" in the 
Japanese strategic culture in post Cold War Japan, which has been advocated by 
Ozawa Ichiro since 1993. In this part, the declared defense policy by the Japanese 
government will also be examined, so as to exhibit the influence of the notion of the 
"normal nation" to the policy preference. In the second part of this chapter, focus 
will be put on the decline of the Pacifist paradigm in the social level. The collapse of 
the JSP and the remarkable change of public opinion towards the overseas dispatch 
under the name of "international contribution" will also be analyzed in details. At 
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last, the chapter will analyze Japan's response to the 911 crisis and the anti-terrorism 
war in 2001 in terms of overseas dispatch from the strategic cultural perspective. 
5,1 Japan 's Emerging New Identity: The ‘‘Normal Nation，， 
The e volution of the Yoshida D octrine finally r cached i ts e nd w hen the new 
paradigm emerged after the end of the Gulf War. It was Ozawa Ichiro, the master 
behind the LDP during the Gulf crisis in 1 990-91，who proposed anew strategic 
concept called "normal nation" that stimulated this evolution. Although Ozawa has 
never become prime minister after the Gulf War, the influence of his strategic 
thinking to the Japanese political circle was profound. 
The Notion of the Normal Nation 
To understand Ozawa's concept of normal nation, one must look at one of his 
classic books titled Blueprint for a New Japan published in 1993. In this book, 
Ozawa started to elaborate his view to Japan's foreign and security policy by 
criticizing Japan's immobility to respond to the Gulf crisis in 1991. He asserts that 
the lack of leadership in politics, policy-making system and competition of power 
caused the Japanese government failing to make a quick response in international 
crisis. The consequence of such problems, caused Japan learned a painful lesson 
from the 1990-91 Gulf crisis as Japan received serious criticisms from the 
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Americans (Ozawa, 1993). Following these discussions, Ozawa suggests that Japan 
should become a country that he calls the "normal nation". 
In Ozawa's perception, the term of normal nation should have two defining 
characteristics: one is "a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities 
regarded as natural in the international community. It does not refuse such burdens 
on account of domestic political difficulties. Nor dose it take action unwillingly as a 
result of 'international pressure'"(Ozawa, 1993，p.94). The other one is a nation that 
"cooperated fully with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable 
lives for their people" (Ozawa, 1993，p.95). In other words, these two criteria 
implied that Japan should bear more responsibilities in the international societies by 
providing more visible "international contribution". 
In fact, there is one more precondition to become a normal nation that Ozawa 
actually did not stress very clearly in his concept of normal nation. That is the 
primacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In another part of the book, he claims that “ the 
best choice for Japan in the coming years is to make international contributions 
based on the firm foundation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty"(Ozawa, 1993， 
p. 106). In O z a w a ' s perspective, the adjustment of Japanese defense arrangements 
should not be conducted by ignoring the role of the United States as the postwar 
history had already proved that Japan has gained a persistent peace and prosperity 
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under the U.S.-Japan security framework. He further claims that the international 
contribution for world peace and prosperity by Japan would be best reflected in the 
combination ofU.S.-U.N. cooperation (Ozawa, 1993, p. l l5) 
Following the grand descriptions of his views towards Japan's foreign and 
security policy, Ozawa then gives a detailed suggestion to implement his ideas. The 
first suggestion, as stated previously, is the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Ozawa claims that as the Japan's neighboring countries (such as China and Korea) 
are still uncomfortable with Japan's independent action due to Japan's performance 
in history, and also the power of the United States is still effective in maintaining 
world peace, the best option for Japan is to continue its defense policy with the 
United States (Ozawa, 1993，pp. 103-106). 
The second measure that Ozawa believes Japan should adopt is to expand the 
role of SDF under the flag of the United Nations. He suggests that the defense 
capability of the SDF should not only stick to the passive "exclusive defense", but 
should leap to the "peace-building strategy that enable the SDF capable to deal with 
the U.N. peacekeeping operation (such as cease firing supervision)". To justify this 
new role for the SDF, Ozawa further suggests an amendment of the Article 9 of the 
Peace Constitution or a legislation of Fundamental Law of Peace and Security. Both 
of these suggestions on c onstitutional reform, firstly, are to reaffirm that Japan is 
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prohibited to use its military forces based on its own decision but has the right of 
self-defense and preserve minimum military self-defense forces. Then, it is 
anticipated that these relevant laws should also clarify that the SDF has the right to 
participate in the U.N.-oriented peacekeeping operation and being used as a U.N. 
reserve army (Ozawa, 1993，pp.110-111). 
To compare the notion of normal nation with other security thinking in 1980s, 
one will find that its major characters are similar to the notion of "liberal realism" as 
has Pyle stated in his article. More significantly, the notion of the normal nation 
does not mark a total break with the Yoshida Doctrine, but a result of the evolution 
of Yoshida Doctrine. This point could be found in Ozawa's book as well. After 
discussing the two criteria of becoming a normal nation, Ozawa intentionally spent 
many words in explaining the misunderstood to the Yoshida Doctrine by most of the 
Japanese politicians. Quoting Yoshida's writing in Japan and the World published 
in 1 96319，Ozawa stated that the strategic decision ofgivingprior i ty to economic 
recovery was made when Japan's economy was still weak. It is not an unchangeable 
principle, nor is it the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine. Based on this assumption, 
Ozawa suggests that the Japanese people must revise their understanding to the 
19 For the relevant details, please see Chapter 3. 
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Yoshida Doctrine and set a new national strategy for Japan in the changing post 
Cold War era (Ozawa, 1993，pp.98-99). 
In sum, the notion of normal nation represents a long-term strategic thinking 
that imposes a new security role for Japan. It does not advocate for changing the 
original defense status of SDF, as Ozawa still emphasizes much more on the 
necessity of exclusive self-defense and U.S.-oriented principle. However, the 
difference of this security thinking compared to the previous one, is that Ozawa 
proposes a more active and flexible role for SDF to be involve in the international 
peacekeeping and peace maintaining operation under the U.N. or U.S.-Japan 
collective security framework. It is this strategic vision that has paved the road for 
the overseas dispatch of the SDF after September 11 terrorist attack in 2001. 
The Changing Security Policy on Overseas Dispatch in 1990s 
The notion o fnorma l nation was in fact, not the only strategic thinking that 
evolved in 1990s. The idea of ‘‘global civilian power", proposed by Funabashi 
Yoichi (A famous politics commentator from Asahi Shimbun) and Takemura 
Masayoshi (one of leaders of New Harbinger Party and chief cabinet secretary in the 
Hosogawa government), also attracts public's attention. This notion stresses the 
importance of the non-military contribution in Japan's foreign and security policy 
option, insisting that Japan should become a "small but shining country"(Green, 
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2001,pp.18-19). In other words, the advocates of this notion believe that Japan 
should not concentrate on expanding Japan's international influence through military 
aspects, but should put more efforts in peace building process such as environmental 
protection and economic and humanitarian a s s i s t a n c e � � . However, the reality was 
that starting from 1992，Japan's defense policy has shown its similarity to the notion 
of normal nation. Even the anti-LDP coalition government took the office between 
1993 and 1996，the adjustments on the role of the SDF were still being conducted. 
The major adjustment of Japan's security role is reflected in the expanding 
scope of using SDF in overseas under two situations. One is in the situation of 
international peacekeeping operation under the flag the U.N.; the other is in the 
situation of U.S.-Japan joint military operation in the area surrounding Japan. 
The enactment of the IPCL in June 1992 was the first step for the change. It 
provides a legal basis for the overseas dispatch of SDF as part of the U.N. 
peacekeeping operation. The major activities that the bill allows the SDF to 
participate in include humanitarian assistance such as medical care，repair of 
transport and communication facilities, election supervision and so on. However, the 
bills were still restricted by several conditions. For example, some front-line 
activities such as assistance in creating cease-fire line, collection of the disposal 
For relevant details, see Funabashi (1993). 
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weapons a re b eing f rozen u ntil 1 999 w hen the new r eview c ompleted. T he IPCL 
stipulated in 1992 was also restricted by the so-called "the five principles": 
1. A cease fire agreement between conflicting parties exist 
2. Participation of Japanese personnel can take place only with consent from 
conflicting parties. 
3. Peacekeeping operation must be conducted impartially. 
4. The Japanese government has the right to withdrawn if any of the above 
requirement break down 
5. Weapons (small weapons) may be used in self-defense only (Tanaka，1997， 
P.319) 
With the several restrictions imposed above, the SDF was being deployed overseas 
in eight areas (Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Golan Heights, East 
Timor, Rwanda, Turkey) for PKO missions and humanitarian relief operation 
between 1993 and 2000. Many other high ranking officials and LDP leaders, such as 
Nakanishi Keisuke, director general of JDA in the Hosokawa government in 1993 
and Watanabe Michio, the former foreign minister, all openly supported these 
activities and stated that these operations are constitutional because the SDF were 
under the command of the United Nations (Mulgan, 1995, pp.1104-
1105).“International Contribution", the term that Ozawa proposed what the SDF 
should fulfill, finally became the reality. 
Another defense policy adjustment that enables the SDF to be deployed 
overseas is the New US-Japan Defense Guideline in 1997. Starting from 1994, the 
United States began to consider adjusting the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 
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new post Cold War environment. When Joseph Nye, the former Harvard specialist 
in international studies, took the office as a deputy chairman in Pentagon, he stated 
clearly that United States should maintain its military forward presence in the 
western pacific region, and that the only way to achieve this goal is to strengthen its 
alliance with Japan. These viewpoints were confirmed in the new strategic official 
document, the United Stated Strategy for the East Asia Region issued in February 
1995. These new developments, exactly meet the U.S.-Japan alliance principle 
proposed by Ozawa in the notion of normal nation. 
In April 1996，U.S. president Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister 
Hashimoto Ryutaro issued the "Japan-U.S. Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 
21 St Century" in Tokyo, which marked the formation of a new security relations 
between the two countries in the post Cold War era. The security documents 
substantiating this security arrangement include the "New Guidelines for US-Japan 
Defense Cooperation", the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and 
Security of Japan in Situations in areas surrounding Japan" and the "Ships 
Inspection Laws". These documents were issued in September 1997, May 1999 and 
September 2000 respectively. In the "New Guideline", the clause of "situations in 
areas surrounding Japan" stipulated that once both Japan and the U.S. concur that 
there is a crisis happened in the areas surrounding, the SDF is allowed to cooperate 
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with the U.S. troops in 1) relief a ctivities a nd m easures to deal w ith r efugees, 2) 
rescue operation, 3) noncombatant evacuation operation, and 4) activities on support 
economic sanctions (Kusano, 1999，pp.l26-127). This arrangement implies that even 
Japan does not face a direct attack in its homeland, the SDF could still to be 
deployed to the area surrounding Japan for providing logistical assistances to the 
U.S. forces in combat. 
In addition to the two bills mentioned previous, the National Defense Program 
Outline (NOPO) drafted in November 1995 was also an official document that 
manifests the adjustment on the use of the SDF under these two situations. In this 
new defense outline, the international peacekeeping operation that involves overseas 
dispatch of SDF was emphasized. The NOPO states that the role of Japan's defense 
capability should be fulfilled in three different sectors. They are: 1) National defense. 
2) Response to large-scale disasters and various situations. 3) Contribution to 
creation of a more stable security environment. In the second part of the second 
sector, it states: "Should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan, which will 
have an important influence on national peace and security, take appropriate 
response in accordance with the constitution and relevant laws and regulations, for 
example, by properly supporting the United Nations activities when needed, and by 
ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security 
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Arrangements" .In the first part of the third sector, it states: "Contribute to efforts for 
international peace through participation in international peace cooperation activities, 
and contribute to promotion of international cooperation through participation in 
international disaster relief activities"(JDA, 1997，pp.293-294) 
To sum up, from all the evidences discussed above reach the conclusion that 
the Japanese defense policy is obviously prepared to fulfill a new strategic role after 
the end of the Cold War as Ozawa suggested in his book. The adjustments 
mentioned above focuses on two dimensions: Japan's role in U.N. peacekeeping 
operation and in U.S.-Japan security framework. In both situations, it is very 
possible that the SDF will be dispatched to conduct a limited and noncombatant 
activities, which is highly congruence wi th the major suggestions reflected i n t h e 
notion of the normal nations offered by Ozawa Ichiro. 
5,3 Decline of the Pacifism 
As some senior politicians left the LDP and form coalition with other opposition 
parties in 1993，the so-called "1955 system" finally collapsed. However, the 
growing up of anti-LDP political forces did not lead to the expansion of pacifist idea, 
conversely, it caused the collapse of JSP, and the decline of pacifism in just ten 
years. 
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The Collapse of JSP and the Rise of DP J 
The most devastating move that lead to the collapse of the JSP in the post Cold 
War Japan was the acceptance of the legitimacy of the SDF and the U.S.-Japan 
alliance by its leader: Murayama Tomiichi. It was almost a political suicide to the 
JSP, which had crippled its public support in the national elections held later (see 
table 5.1 and 5.2). 
The leaders of JSP have never came into office at the national level since 1948. 
Yet, in 1994, the JSP faced its first opportunity to control the power. However, they 
did not bring its pacifist stand into the government policy, but chose to face the 
reality. In a formal policy statement in 1994，the Murayama government located that 
it would promote Japan's participation in international peacekeeping operation 
within the scope of cooperation for the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and 
humanitarian assistance (Mulgan, 1995, pp.1105-1106). In 1995，Prime Minister 
Murayama declared that the party supported the existence of the SDF and the 
necessity of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The new NOPO was passed in the Murayame 
cabinet, even though the JSP has strived to put more defense constraints inside the 
NOPO (such as the prohibition of the exercise of the right of collective self defense), 
it was regarded as a major shift of JSP's defense policy position from its long 
standing principle o f " unarmed neutrality". 
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YEAR ITOTAL SEATS ILDP [ J ^ IKOMEIT I D S P [ J C T IDW 
o 
1992 512 274 W 46 " 13 16 - -
1995 511 m 70 - - 15 - -
1998 500 - ： 26 52 15 
2001 1479 1232 |- |31 |- 丨20 |l29 |l9 “ 
Table 5.1: The Collapse of JSP and the Rise of DPJ in the House of Representatives (Lower 
House) after the four elections from 1992 to 2001 
Source: The Statistics of Japan (Nihon no Tokei), 1992, 1995，1998’ and 2001. Prime Minister Office. 
“ i T O T A L SEATS iLDP IJSP iKOMEIT iDSP IJCP IDPJ ISDP 
YEAR 0 
1992 252 106 73 24 U U - ： 
1995 252 ^ 66 ： i i ： -
1998 2 5 2 ~ 112 — - - ： 14 23 2A 
2001 1251 Ill2 I- |31 I- |23 |58 |13 ~ ~ 
Table 5.2: The Collapse of JSP and the Rise of DPJ in the House of House of Councilors (Upper 
House) after the four elections from 1992 to 2001 
Source: The Statistics of Japan (Nihon no Tokei), 1992’ 1995’ 1998，and 2001. Prime Minister Office. 
The collapse of the JSP had a significant impact to the Japanese political map. 
In 1998，except the JCP and SDP, almost all other political parties adopt a security 
policy that is very similar to the notion of normal nation. Among these parties, a new 
opposition party was formed, which showed a strong vitality and form challenge to 
the ruling LDP in the national election. This new political party is the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ). 
The DPJ was formed in March 1998 under the leadership of Kan Naoto and 
Hatoyama Yukio. The main body of member of the DPJ was absorbed from 
different political parties such as New Frontier Party, Social Democratic Party, the 
Democratic Socialist Party, the Harbinger Party and the Japan New Party, all of 
which are small parties that split from LDP and JSP. Although the members of DPJ 
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are almost all come from the opposite political forces of LDP, the basic principle of 
DPJ's security policy is similar to that of the LDP. To be more specific, the DP J also 
supported the U.S.-Japan alliance and the necessity of the SDF, calling for a more 
mature relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and proposing a policy that put 
more effort on U.N. centered, multilateral buildup. On the SDF issue, they also 
called for continual stipulation of defensive military status and agreed the 
establishment of emergency legislation (Green, 2000’ pp.52-53). 
The Change of Public Opinion 
The public opinion towards the overseas dispatch of the SDF also shifted in the 
mid-1990s. The Asahi polls conducted in 1991 and 1992 revealed that the supporters 
of overseas dispatch increased incrementally (See figure 5.1), from about 56 percent 
in April 1991 to 71 percent in the same period in the following years. 
Public Opinion of Overseas Dispatch of the SDF 199 
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Figure 5.1. Public Opinion to Overseas Dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces in 1991-92 {Asahi 
Shimbun, April 1991，June 1991 and Dec 1992) 
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Sources: Hook, Glenn D (1996) Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan 
London; New York: Routledge, pp.116-117. 
Although the polls showed above revealed the growing public acceptance of 
SDF's overseas dispatch, the central norms of rejecting the use of force for military 
purpose was still unshaken. In the two polls conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in 1991 
and 1992, nearly half of those polled in favor of non-military use of the SDF in the 
overseas dispatch mission, only less than 5 percent approved the use of the SDF in 
military activities (See figure 5.2). These detailed investigations seems having 
proved like what Hook has stated: “ the military use of the SDF in order to realize 
state goals still does not enjoy popular legitimacy, even after the Cold War"(Hook, 
1996, P.41). 
However, this trend does not mean that the masses rejected the overseas 
dispatch of SDF under any condition. In the following years between 1994 and 2000, 
the P rime M inister O ffice h a d e onducted f our su rveys on the d efense a ffairs. T he 
surveyors separate the term of overseas dispatch into two different dimensions: the 
overseas dispatch for the purpose of disaster relief and the overseas dispatch for 
peacekeeping operation. The result of the surveys showed a continual support of 
these two types of overseas dispatch (see figure 5.3 and 5.4)，which revealed the 
general acceptance of Japanese public on using the SDF under the name of 
"international contribution". Thus, it could be concluded that the public opinion to 
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the defense affairs in Japan has been approaching to the Ozawa's idea of normal 
nation. 
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Figure 5.2 Expectations to SDF's role in Overseas Dispatch {Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 1991 and 
April 1992) 
Sources: Hook, Glenn D (1996) Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan 
London; New York: Routledge, pp.116-117. 
The Overseas Dispatch for Disaster Relief 
100 “ “ …；、c~厂；)：>""“： 
七 , 、 8 6 . 3 80 ^ ~ — . -
. 6 0 —-61.6 _ 丄 、 摩 ; ^ 零 飞 、 二 聊 。 1 
> ‘ ‘-、，.、、访.<>@-�v«. . - A- ^  —Oppose 
40 ’- 、- )：：、：;/>.—〜、 
2 � 一 2 1 . � i 叙 : a 
1/1994 7/1995 2/1997 1/2000 
Date 
Figure 5.3 The Overseas Dispatch for Disaster Relief 
Sources: The Prime Minister Office of Japan. See website: http://www8.cao.go.ip/survev/v-
index.html 
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Overseas Dispatch of SDF for Peacekeeping 
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Figure 5.4 The Overseas Dispatch for Peacekeeping 
Sources: The Prime Minister Office of Japan. See website: http://www8.cao.go.ip/survev/v-
index.html 
5.4 Japan After the 911: Sending the SDF Overseas 
The September terrorist attack to the United States in 2001 was not only a 
deep shock towards leadership in Washington, but also in Tokyo. In the following 
half year after the bloody tragedy, the Koizumi cabinet showed an unprecedented 
initiative in assisting the United States fighting against international terrorism in 
Afghanistan. It was the first time that the SDF being deployed overseas for assisting 
troops in a combatant mission, and it was also the first time that showed that Japan 
is determined to share its security burden with the United States on a global security 
issue, which is also the spirit behind the notion of normal notion. 
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The Rapid Policy Response of Koizumi's Cabinet 
The responses of the government in Tokyo to the September 1 广*^  attack were far 
quicker and more substantial than those during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91. Within 45 
minutes, a special emergency task force has been formed in the prime minister's 
office^'. To deal with the crisis, Koizumi sent a message to President George W. 
Bush one day after the attack, announced that such attack is a "mean and outrageous 
act that cannot be forgiven". He then sent a condolence to the U.S. president and the 
people of the United States in behalf of people in Japan (Sakai, 2003, p.l60). 
The substantial assistances were also followed by the support in words. On 12 
September, the Security Council of Japan adopted a Governmental Response Plan 
consisting of six items, which contained gathering accurate information on the 
situation including the safety of Japanese nationals and reinforcing security at U.S.-
related facilities. Two government SDF aircrafts also stood by at Haneda Airport for 
possible deployment of Japanese Disaster Relief Team^l Tokyo also announced that 
Japan would contribute 20 million to victims' families and for rescuing operations in 
the United States. Emergency aids were also provided to Pakistan and India for their 
cooperation against the terrorism. 
21 The Japanese time when US was attacked on September 11 was 21:45 pm. See IDA website: 
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm 
22 See JDA website: http://www.ida.go.ip/e/index .htm 
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On the other hand, the military measures were also considered in order to prevent 
any possible terrorism attack to the SDF or U.S. troops stationed in Japan. Nakatani, 
the Chief General of the JDA, dictated all SDF units should keep high alert to guard 
the U.S. military installations in Japan. Since the coming assistance such as overseas 
dispatch of SDF to the Middle East would not be allowed in the existing legal 
security framework, and the information provided by Yanai Shunji, the ambassador 
of Japan in Washington also revealed that the U.S. might launch a military strike 
against Afghanistan, Koizumi cabinet immediately decided to embark upon a 
legislation related to anti-terrorism activities on 16 September (Komatsu, 2001). 
After harmonized with other two ruling parties, the Komeito and Hoshuto, Koizumi 
announced a seven-point plan to assist American war against terrorism on 19 
September. The seven-points includes: 
1. Take steps to enable the SDF to provide logistical support to the US military in 
the event of a retaliatory strike in areas such as medical services, transportation 
and logistics 
2. Take steps to strength security measures at important facilities in Japan, 
including US military bases 
3. Dispatch SDF ships to gather information 
4. Further strengthen international cooperation over immigration control 
5. Provide humanitarian and economic aid to neighboring and involved countries, 
including the provision of emergency economic assistance to Pakistan and 
India 
6. Take steps to help refugees, who might flee areas affected by the potential US 
military action, possibly as part of humanitarian aid by the SDF. 
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7. Cooperate with other countries and take appropriate steps so that there would 
be no disorder in the economic systems of Japan or the rest of the world^^. 
From these measures, it was found a major adjustment of policy on the use of the 
SDF overseas, as the third clause proposed that Japan could have a deployment of 
the SDF to the Indian Ocean during the wartime. On 5 October, the Koizumi cabinet 
submitted three defense bills: Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the bill to 
revise the SDF Law and a bill to revise the Japan Coast Guard Law. All of these 
three bills were approved by the Diet on 29 October. However, the SDF's C-130 
transport aircrafts have already been sent to Islamabad on 9 October 2001(Sakai, 
2003，pp.160-161). Following the passage of the three relevant bills on 29 October 
with an extraordinary speed, six transport aircrafts from Air Self-Defense Forces 
(ASDF)，with 1500 personnel, and three naval vessels from the MSDF have been 
dispatched for supporting the Operation Enduring Freedom launched by the U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan.^"^ From that moment, for the first time, the SDF started to 
provide rear-area support to the U.S. troops during the wartime. 
Unlike the Gulf crisis in 1 991，the role of U.S. pressure (gaiasu) was not so 
decisive. Conversely, it has shown in two events that officials inside the Japanese 
23 See IDA website: http://www.ida.go.jp/e/index .htm 
24 The three navel vessels were sent on November 9出 2001 from Sasebo naval base in Kyushu. These 
three naval vessels are: helicopter destroyer Kurama, destroyer Kirisame and supply ship Haman. All 
of them carried a total number of 700 hundred JMSDF personnel. For the detail, please see the record 
from JMSDF in Japanese: http://wwwjda.tzojp/JMSDF/newpage/hakenkvourvokii/index.html 
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government created the pressure. On 15 September，Japanese media reported that 
on US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage advised Japanese ambassador in 
Washington that Japan should "show the flag" in any future military operation. 
According to Midford's study, a Japanese journal called Bunshun Shunkan published 
in December 2001 cited information provided by a Japanese diplomat who was 
present at the meeting with Armitage, claiming that he did not remember that 
Armitage had give the “show the flag" remark during the meeting. Thus, it is very 
possible that the Foreign Ministry of Japan had made this pressure for accelerating 
the relevant defense legislations inside the country (Midford, 2003，pp.335-336). 
Another example of what Midford called the "manufactured pressure" was reported 
by Asahi Shimbun on May and July 2002. The reports exposed that the MSDF 
officials had approached high-rank American naval officials in Japan for requesting 
‘‘pressure，，on overseas dispatch of the SDF (includes the deployment of Aegis 
destroyer and P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft) to Arabian Sea for two times just 
after September 11出 attack and on April 2002. In this process, the MSDF 
officials also presented a list of various measures that they prepared to conduct. 
These measures include logistical support of U.S. fleet, intelligence gathering and so 
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on, which w ere very similar to the operation conducted by MSDF later in I ndian 
Ocean25. 
Despite a 111hat, the new 1 egislation is not without restrictions. The Japanese 
government still tended to avoid the SDF to be involved in a direct combat, which 
may easily being regarded as a violation to the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. 
Firstly, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law prohibited the SDF from 
supporting the allied troops in the combat area. It stipulated that the SDF is 
prohibited from supplying or transporting weapons and ammunition in foreign 
territory, and from fueling or conducting maintenance on aircraft preparing for 
combat mission. It only allows the SDF to supply fuel and materials to the allied 
forces and may only transport weapons in the high sea or in the intemational air 
spaces. Secondly, the Prime Minister is guided that he or she should obtain the 
approval of the Diet for the implementation of the dispatching of the SDF within 20 
days after initiation. If the Diet does not approve the deployment, the relevant 
operations need to be immediately terminated. Thirdly, the duration of the Anti-
Terrorism Special Measure Law is limited to two years. It can be extended by setting 
a separate law that not more than two years if it is still necessary^^. 
25 For the detail, see website: http://www5a.biglobe.ne.ip/~katsuaki/sesou37b.htm or Asahi Shimbun, 
6出 May and 4出 July 2002 in Japanese, and Midford Paul, "Japan's Response to Terror," in Asian 
Survey, March/April 2003, pp.329-351. 
26 See JDA website: http://www.ida.go.ip/e/index .htm 
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The Attitude of Opposition Parties and Mass Opinion 
The opposition parties and the public opinion towards the Koizumi's responses 
to the terrorism attack in the U.S. did not show a strong resistance as it did in the 
Gulf crisis in 1991，particularly on the issue of overseas dispatch of the SDF on a 
non-combat mission. 
For the political parties, except the traditional left parties such as JCP and SDP, 
which have been consistently opposing the dispatch of the SDF for any purpose, the 
consensus reached by the rest of the political parties did not show significant 
difference with the LDP in principle. For instance, Hatayama Yukio, the chief of the 
DPJ said to the media, "dispatching the SDF to provide support to the U.S. military 
strikes did not violate Japan's pacifist Constitution.''^^ Although the DPJ did show 
some different views about the detailed content of the new bills, such as requesting 
for a U.N. resolution and a limited time period as a precondition for the SDF's 
overseas dispatch, they did not intend to block the passage o f the legislation at last, 
even their requests were not accepted eventually by the LDP (Liu, 2002). It is 
possible that as the Yomiuri Shimbun has pointed out that the DPJ wanted to use 
Kouizumi's popularity to push the structural reforms, which is also DPJ's own 
27 This speech was reported by Kyoto News Agency, November 2001 
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policy，but it should not be denied that the DPJ's defense policy towards the 
terrorism and the overseas dispatch was similar to LDP's policy in nature. 
Likewise, in spite of the Japanese public opinion towards overseas dispatch of 
the SDF has shown hesitation at the beginning of the crisis, it was lately revealed 
that the general public is tolerant to this operation as the government stressed that 
the deployment of the SDF in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea would not 
involved a directly engagement of Japanese troops into the battlefield. According to 
the Asahi polls conducted on 1 October, 42 percent of those polled supported the 
overseas dispatch of the SDF for providing logistical support to U.S. troops, versus 
46 percent oppose. About a half month later (16 October), the opinion barometer has 
turned, showing that 49 percent support and 40 percent opposition. In the latest 
survey conducted by the Prime Minister Office in January 2003, about 65 percent of 
those polled supported the overseas dispatch of the SDF, with only 15 percent 
opposed it. 
28 See Yomiuri Shumbun, 5 November 2001 
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Overseas Dispatch of SDF after 911 
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Figure 5.5 Public Opinion to the Overseas Dispatch of the SDF after 911 
Sources: Asahi Shimbun, 丨 October and October; The Prime Minister Office of Japan. See 
website: http://www8.cao.go.ip/siirvev/v-index.html 
In Sum 
Japan's response to the September 11 attack is a reflection of the notion of the 
normal nation. Tokyo did not isolate itself from the U.S.-oriented international 
community like it did in 1991，nor did it embroil itself directly into the battlefield in 
Afghanistan. American scholars Eric Heginbotham and Richard F.Sammuels 
recently realized that such characters of Japan's security policy, commenting that 
Japan's responses towards America's anti-terrorism war were a symbolic action. 
They suggest that the Koizumi cabinet was trying to make a balance between the 
U.S.-Japan alliance relations and Japan's own economic interests in the Middle East， 
both of which are important to Japan's comprehensive national security. It was the 
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"mercantile concerns --- and not pacifism or the desire to make Japan a 'normal' 
military nation ---that won the day and determined its policies on Afghanistan. 
Japan undertook the minimum commitments necessary to let it claims to be 
supporting the U.S. campaign"(Heginbotham and Sammuels, 2002, p.115). 
Heginbotham and Sammuels's conclusion is partly correct. The term of the 
normal nation invented by Ozawa has never implied that Japan should become a 
true normal nation with independent military power. It is the "prohibition of use of 
force independently under the Article 9 of Constitution", "the maintenance of U.S.-
Japan security alliance" and, "the expanding of SDF's role in the UN peacekeeping 
operation under the name of international contribution", that constitute the major 
principles in Ozawa's strategic thought. It is also this reason that made most of the 
opposition parties and the masses having limited anti-militarism sentiments, 
basically supported government's approach in dealing with the 911 crisis. The 
overseas dispatch of the SDF in the Indian Ocean was only a response with political 
significance, like what Yoshida had done five decades ago, which aims to achieve 
Japan's long-term strategic objectives. 
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Table 5.3: The Chronology of Japan's Response to September Attack 
11 September 2001 Terrorists attacked World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in 
Washington 
12 September The Security Council of Japan adopted a Governmental Response Plan 
consisting of six items. Government announced economic assistance to 
the U.S., Pakistan and India for rescuing operation and activities against 
terrorism 
19 September Japan announced seven-point plan for assisting American's war against 
terrorism in Afghanistan 
5 October Koizumi cabinet submitted three bills related to anti-terrorism to the 
Diet 
7 October Operation Enduring Freedom launched by US and British troops against 
Afghanistan started 
9 October Three C-130H transport aircrafts from ASDF were dispatched to 
Islamabad. 
18 October Three anti-terrorism bills were enacted in the House of Representatives 
29 October Three anti-terrorism bills were enacted in the House of Councils 
9 November Three naval vessels from the JMSDF left Japan for mission in Indian 
Ocean 
25 November Three more naval vessels were dispatched 
2 December JMSDF started to provide logistical support to US and British troops 




The different policy response on overseas dispatch of the SDF in the two crises well 
illustrates with great clarity the change in paradigms in the Japanese strategic culture 
in both ruling and social level. In this sense, the overseas dispatch of the SDF is not 
only a policy decision that demonstrates how far would Japan contribute to the 
international security, but also a crucial indicator showing how far that Japanese 
political elites and the masses would tolerate on the issue of the use of armed force 
overseas. 
6.1 Japan Between the Pacifist Nation and Great Military Power 
By assessing the different policy response of SDF's overseas dispatch during 
the two international crises, this study shows that the strategic culture also has a 
central role to play. In the early postwar era, we have seen the emergence of two 
types of paradigm inside the Japanese strategic culture: the Yoshida Doctrine and the 
Pacifism, which are opposite in nature. These two types of paradigm dominated the 
direction of Japan's security policy development for almost 50 years, which 
eventually shaped the different mode of response of the Japanese government on the 
affair of overseas dispatch of the SDF during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Following the 
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interpretation from strategic cultural perspective to the Gulf crisis, this research also 
suggests that Japan's quick response after the September 11 attack and anti-terrorism 
war is also related to the growing similarity of two types of paradigm. Sufficient 
evidence adopted in the studies indicates that there was a strong inclination of 
tolerance on sending the SDF overseas for peacekeeping operation and logistical 
support in both the ruling and social level. It is believed that the "new old paradigm"-
the notion of “Normal Nation", which has gained merits from the "Yoshida 
Doctrine", played a decisive role during this process. 
In this study, we have not only seen the change in Japan's security policy and its 
strategic culture but also their continuity. The change of the policy on overseas 
dispatch is limited in terms of scope and intensity of use of force, which implies that 
the shift of the Japanese strategic culture though did occur, but is also with its limits. 
Some scholars conclude that the dispatch of the SDF to Persian Gulf after the Gulf 
War in 1991 and the Indian Ocean in 2001 indicates that Japan is seeking to become 
a great military power after the end of Cold War (Guo, 2003). Such argument, 
however, was not entirely accurate if looking at it from strategic cultural perspective. 
In this research, we find that when the first wave of minesweepers from the 
MSDF were sent to the Gulf in April 1991, there was still no consensus in the 
Japanese society on how far should Japan go to contribute to the international 
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security (particularly the contribution during the war time), despite the majority of 
public o pinion had s howed i ts 1 imited t olerance d uring t hat p eriods o f t ime. S uch 
worries were also reflected in the 1992 IPCL, which was put several constraints on 
the use of force to the personnel of the SDF who had joined the PKO activities. 
Therefore, it is hard to say that Japan's overseas military dispatch in 1991 was an 
intentional plan right from the beginning of the crisis. 
The similar observation could also be found in 2001. As Katzenstain and 
Berger all have pointed out, the prompt dispatch of the SDF was largely a symbolic 
political action, rather than a substantial military operation that could help in the 
process of war, despite the U.S. was at the beginning determined to launch a war and 
win it by its own effort (Berger, 2002; Katzenstein, 2002). The overseas dispatch of 
the SDF in 2001 was largely aimed at fulfilling the international security norms and 
the aspiration of taking more burdens on the security affairs from Washington as well 
as international community. The three relevant defense bills still prohibit Japan from 
assisting a direct combat support to the U.S. troops. 
To the largest extend, Japan's defense policy on overseas dispatch in 2001 was 
quick than the previous crisis, but without fundamental change. The principle shared 
by both the Yoshida Doctrine and the Normal Nation -- the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
limited role of SDF, are still the central elements in the Japanese strategic culture. 
Ill 
More importantly, neither the Yoshida Doctrine, nor the notion of the Normal Nation, 
advocates that Japan should adopt an assertive security policy or a pure pacifist 
security policy. The analysis from strategic cultural perspective in this research 
would suggest that neither “pacifist country" nor "great military power" is an 
accurate description of Japan's current security status. Conversely, the truth lies 
somewhere in between. Unless there is a major shift in intemational material and 
normative structure (such as the decline of U.S. hegemony and the fade of 
democratic value) that cause a calamitous impact on Japan's strategic position, Japan 
would still be a state that stands between a pacifist nation and a great military power. 
Following this assumption, Japan is not likely to use its military forces independently 
overseas in the foreseeable future, rather, it is very possible that Japan might have 
expanded the function and the scope of use of force only under the U.N. and US-
Japan security framework in the coming decades. 
6.2 The Significance and Limitation of the Research 
Since the end of Cold War, various analyses about Japan's security 
development h ave b een drawn out in the field o f s ecurity and IR s tudies. A mong 
these assessments, some scholars warn that Japan will be soon remilitarized, as the 
U.S. and Japan has lost their common enemy. (Friedman and Lebard 1991; Liu, 
1995), whereas others disagree with those predictions by stressing the importance of 
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democratic nature of Japanese regime in affecting its security policy behavior 
(Kitaoka, 1999; He, 2000). Since the mid-1990s, the concerns on Japan's security 
development continued. Katzenstein's study on Japan's security policy with a 
constructivist perspective opened a new arena in the IR field. Meanwhile, in 
Mainland China, the debate about the “new thinking on China's Japan policy" has 
also attracted people's attention on Japan's security affairs^^. Owing to this, it is 
hoped that this research could build a dialogue with the recent studies on Japan's 
security in the western academic circle, and also provide a theoretical and empirical 
basis for further discussion on how to perceive Japan's security affairs, which was 
shown as one of the major concerns in the debate about "new thinking on China's 
Japan policy". 
Certainly, this research also leaves questions that deserve further study. For 
example, one of the vital questions that revealed in this research is: Why has the 
nature of the Japanese strategic culture changed between the ten years? Or to be 
more specific, what factor(s) had caused the shift of the Japanese strategic culture in 
both ruling and social level? The possible answers for this question could range from 
economic factor to cultural factor, or from international structural factor (like U.S. 
factor) to domestic political factor. It is expected that further empirical study on 
29 For details, please see Zha (2003) 
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exploring the reason of the shift can greatly contribute to understanding the internal 
logic of Japan's security policy development in the future. 
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